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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the critical conditions of such semiotic realism that is commonly
presumed in the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of biosemiotics. The central task is
to make basic biosemiotic concepts as clear as possible by applying C.S. Peirce’s
pragmaticist methodology to his own concepts, especially to those that have had a strong
influence on the Copenhagian biosemiotics. It appears essential to study what kinds of
observation the basic semiotic concepts are derived from. Peirce had two different
derivations to the concept of sign, both having a strong logical character. Therefore, it is
discussed at length what Peirce’s conception of logic consists of and how logical
concepts relate to the concepts of other sciences. It is shown that Peirce had two different
perspectives toward sign, the ‘transcendental’ one and the objective one, and only the
latter one is executable in biosemiotic applications. Although Peirce’ theory of signs
seems to appear as twofold (if not even manifold), it is concluded that the core
conception has been stable. The apparent differences are presumably due to the different
perspectives of consideration.
Severe limitations for the application of Peirce’s semiotic concepts follow from this
analysis and this should be taken into account in biosemiotics relying on its Copenhagen
interpretation. The first one concerns the ‘interpreter’ of a suggested biosemiotic sign —
whether it is ‘we’ (as a ‘meta-agent’) or some genuine biosemiotic ‘object-agent’. Only if
the latter one is determinable, some real biosemiotic sign-action may occur. The second
one concerns the application of the concept of the object of sign —  its use is limited so
that a sign has an object if and only if it seeks a true conception about it. This conclusion
has drastic further consequences.
Most of the genuinely biosemiotic sign-processes do not tend toward truth about anything
but toward various practical ends. Therefore, the logical concept of sign, e.g. the one of
Peirce’s semeiotic, is an insufficient concept for biosemiotics. In order to establish a
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sufficient one, Peircean theoretical ethics and esthetics are introduced. It is concluded that
they involve simpler and more general but still normative concept of sign —  the concept
of anticipative or constructive representation that does not represent any object at all.
Instead, it is a completely future-oriented representation that guides action. Objective
ethics provides the suitable concept of representation, but it appeals to objective esthetics
that provides a theory of (local) natural self-normativity. The concepts of objective logic
form the special species of objective ethics. The conclusion is that biosemiotics should be
based on applied objective ethics and esthetics rather than on (Peircean semeiotic) logic
and its metaphysical application.
Finally, the physiosemiotic over-generalization of the concept of sign is shortly discussed.
It is suggested that it would be more appropriate to rename such controversial
generalizations than to adhere to semiotic terminology. Here, again, Peirce appears as a
healthy role model with his ‘ethics of terminology’.
1. PRAGMATICIST BIOSEMIOTICS
1.1. The Quest for Biosemiotic Realism
Biosemiotics can be loosely defined as “the science of signs in living systems” (Kull
1999: 386). It can be taken as a mere heuristic device, eliminable language-game, illustrative
metaphor, or decorative topping for primary biological theory, but more often biosemioticians
hope it could bring up some new substantial theory or irreducible concept to biology. If this
latter aim is considered possible and desirable, the signs that biosemiotics is supposed to
study should be considered as signs for living systems themselves. That would mean that the
biosemiotic point of view should include some more or less vague notion about semiotic
realism1 that actual signs, meanings, etc. are effective or active — i.e. real— as signs
independently on their being observed, interpreted, and conceptualized by us humans (cf.
Emmeche 2004: 118). The expectation is that we could find some semiotic action in nature
that is as real as plain physical action and irreducible to it. The purpose of this paper is to
study the conditions of the possibility of such biosemiotic realism in relation to contemporary
biosemiotics, and especially to its ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ that is, perhaps, its most
developed and ambitious school so far.2
Most obvious candidates for presumably real natural signs are found by extending the
common sense conception about human signs into the animal kingdom. This extension was
put forward in the first decades of the 20th century by the grounding classic of biosemiotics,
Jakob von Uexküll, and independently from the 60’s onward by Thomas Sebeok (cf. Kull
1 If the philosophical quarrel about realism is found too confusing or disturbing, it could be replaced by talk about
semiotic materialism (cf. Hoffmeyer 1997b) instead of realism.
2 The seminal publications of ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of biosemiotics are Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991,
Emmeche and Hoffmeyer 1991, and Hoffmeyer 1996 (orig. 1993). Søren Brier’s cybersemiotics (e.g. Brier
2003) is quite close to it. The other main wings of general biosemiotics are following: 2. Tartu ecosemiotics by
Kalevi Kull, inspired by (e.g.) Lotman’s cultural semiotics and deep ecology, ”investigates human
relationships to nature which have a semiosic (sign-mediated) basis” (Kull 1998, 351). 3. Prague
biohermeneutics by Anton Markoš (2002) is applying hermeneutic (e.g. Gadamer and Ricoeur) into biology. A
somewhat critical attitude toward the mainstream neo-Darwinist paradigm is common to all these three. 4.
Marcello Barbieri’s (2003), say, biosemantics in terms of organic meaning and code is a somewhat more
traditionally naturalist approach. In addition, zoösemiotics, phytosemiotics, and even robosemiotics could be
listed as subdisciplines of biosemiotics. About the (pre)history of whole biosemiotics, see Kull 2005.
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2005: 6,13-14). Animal percepts and communicative gestures seem to work as signs for the
animals themselves independently on our interpretations about them.3 However, besides these
zoösemiotic extensions, contemporary biosemiotics contains extensions that are much more
radical. It argues for the reality of some intraorganismic, endosemiotic signs as signs, such as
metabolically active enzymes, hormones, immunological antibodies, and those DNA-
sequences that work as genes. That they have biological significance as signs — and not
merely as molecules—  independently on what we humans think them to be, is one of the
basic hypotheses in the Copenhagen interpretation of biosemiotics. However, the peculiarity
of being and functioning as a sign in such application have to be specified. What difference
does it make to consider, say, a gene as a sign rather than as a sequence of a DNA-molecule?
The conception of sign commonly used in the Copenhagen interpretation has been
loosely captured from Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic.4 A Peircean sign consists of three
components: its object, representamen, and interpretant. Their triadic constitution is
irreducible —  they have no identity as an object, representamen, and interpretant
independently on the whole sign they are part of. However, they may have independent
identities as things or events. To put the basic idea simply, when a (first) thing or an event is
cognized as a representamen of some sign, it is recognized to refer to another (second) thing
or event, the object of that sign. Concurrently, this act of recognition means the production of
a third thing or event in the mind of a recognizer, the interpretant of the sign. This
interpretant refers to that same object becoming accordingly another sign of the object.5 It is
commonly assumed among biosemioticians that real biosemiotic signs take such triadic form.
      Sign or
Representamen
Object Interpretant
Figure 1. Basic form of Peircean sign
Not surprisingly, the vague semiotic realism suggested from the biosemiotic point of
view comes close to those metaphysical doctrines that Peirce called his ‘objective idealism’
or ‘(extreme) scholastic realism’. They argue for the notion that ‘ideas’ (i.e. signs, laws,
3 A beautiful example can be found in Hoffmeyer (1997a) who refers to the field studies of Anthony Holley (1993):
“A brown hare can run almost 50 per cent faster than a fox, but when it spots a fox approaching, it stands bolt
upright and signals its presence (with ears erect and the ventral white fur clearly visible), instead of fleeing.
After 10 years and 5000 hours of observation Holley concluded that this behaviour is energy saving: if a fox
knows it has been seen, it will not bother to give chase, so saving the hare the effort of running.”
4 The term “semeiotic” is used here to refer to Peirce’s own specific theory and conception about semiotic which, in
turn, is used to refer generally to the subject area of sign studies.
5 Thus, an interpretant is always a product of a sign as sign. It can not have an independent existence as a thing or
event.
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habits, universals, final causes, and even qualities) are objectively cognizable as real,6 not that
they were all real, but that some are (cf. CP 5.430, 5.453, 6.24-25, EP 2:343). This last
reservation forms a challenge also to biosemiotics: which ones of the presumed biosemiotic
signs are real and actual independently on us, and which ones are not but are real and
effective — as signs— only through our interpretation, only because we consider them as
signs. These latter ones are not signs for the supposed living systems themselves. They do not
act as signs in these systems but their significant effects are reducible to their physical effects.
Although there are plenty of good reasons to maintain that genes are some kind of real
signs, it has appeared difficult to determine what kind of signs genes are, i.e. how they
function and are structured as signs.7 This difficulty can be seen as a symptom of the
importance of the above mentioned challenge and it indicates there being some principal
problems either in the whole concept of sign itself or in its application to biology. I have
suggested (Vehkavaara 2002) that the difficulties follow from the fact that the concept of sign
(if taken as a meaningful sign and not merely as a signal) is a mentalist concept. It is
originally derived from our internal self-understanding and thought to refer to things that have
a mental component (in our mind). Therefore, its comprehensibility is ultimately dependent
on the first person perspective. Signs are familiar to us as signs interpreted by me and
meaningful to me. That also other people interpret signs meaningful to them, I cannot
similarly ‘directly know’, but first I have to assume that these others are similar enough to me
in this respect.8 Though this hypothesis is practically quite safe in anthroposemiotics, it
becomes daring when it is extended — as in biosemiotics—  to concern other forms of life than
mere human beings, and it becomes even more daring when possible endosemiotic signs are
considered. It is far from clear how the identities and boundaries of ‘interpreting agents’ (or
their correspondents) could be determined for endosemiotic signs and to what extent these
agents are similar to us. To whom do genes, hormones, antibodies, etc. appear at the same
time both cognizable and meaningful? Because of the mentalist human point of view, an
implicit assumption about some ‘human mind kind of’ semiotic agent is built into the
structure of the concept of sign, and consequently into the whole (Peircean) biosemiotics.
This somewhat ‘necessary’ anthropomorphism is one source of the difficulty in distinguishing
real biosemiotic signs from imagined ones (i.e. from those ones, which are effective as signs
only through our interpretations). If biosemiotics is supposed to produce more than mere
emotional effects in science, or if it is going to be more than mere vague poetic metaphor, the
concept of sign has to be abstracted and defined carefully —  mere intuitive common sense
idea does not suffice.
6 Peirce’s use of the term ‘real’ is contrasted to figment rather than to ideal. Anything that is not dependent on
cognizer’s will and imagination at the moment of cognition is real: “That is real which has such and such
characters, whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or not.” (EP 2:342, 1905.)
7 Some discussion can be found in Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (1991), Sharov (1998), and Vehkavaara (1998, 2002).
See also Chapter 4.2.
8 Without that assumption, we could as well propose other people being mere zombies or skillfully programmed
robots by some evil spirit.
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1.2. Why to Make Our Semiotic Concepts Clear?
Peirce himself was well aware of the initial anthropomorphism of his approach and
admitted that his anthropomorphic starting point is a possible source of error (EP 2:410,
1907). Still, he proudly maintained that anthropomorphic hypotheses are generally profitable
for scientific explanations (EP 2:193, 1903). The anthropomorphic errors should nevertheless
be avoided. One common source of such errors is the intuitive or ‘metaphorical’ basis of used
semiotic concepts. In order to avoid “unclear and nonsensical hypotheses” that the
anthropomorphic starting point easily produces, Peirce developed the pragmaticist
methodology (or ‘methodeutic’) for science (cf. CP 5.212, 1903 and 5.401-402, 1878).
Because of the above-mentioned ‘necessary anthropomorphism’ of biosemiotics, we must be
extra careful when applying semiotic concepts to living phenomena. If they were made as
‘clear and distinct’ as possible, we might find out how and where they should, or could,
justifiably be applied in biosemiotics. Let us try Peirce’s method and apply the principles of
pragmaticism to his own semiotic conceptions —  and especially to his triadic concept of sign.
There are numbers of reasons why we cannot merely refer to Peirce as an authority what
comes to the theory and concept of sign. Peirce had no single unified and well-grounded
theory of signs, but numbers of partly incompatible notions and concepts composed during a
period that took almost 50 years. Although they have more unity than it may seem on the
surface, Peirce himself noticed that most that he states about signs is not a scientific result,
but based only on “a strong impression due to a life-long study of signs” (EP 2:413, 1907).
He explicitly denied having tenable grounds for his “sundry universal propositions
concerning signs” (EP 2:462, 1911) and seemingly never achieved a clear and scientifically
grounded conception about what semiotic would be. He was a pioneer or a backwoodsman of
semiotic, as he characterized himself (EP 2:413, 1907). In spite of his efforts, semiotic was
not yet a science in Peirce’s times (and hardly even in our times) —  there was no scientific
community of semioticians any more than established basic theory about it. It had no
unambiguous niche in Peirce’s classification of sciences that was intended to be about
sciences in their present condition. If related to existing sciences, some of his own
judgements about signs should clearly be classified under psychological sciences, some under
metaphysics, most of them under logic, and some under mathematics. Moreover, some of
these statements are dependent on others according to the science they belong. The validity of
metaphysical judgements, especially, is dependent on the corresponding logical ones (but not
vice versa) that, in turn, are dependent on some mathematical principles (cf. Chapters 2.2 and
2.3).
Despite his self-criticality and awareness about the grounds of his notions, Peirce
certainly thought having strong scientific grounds for some of his conceptions although he
doomed many of them as mere impressions. An impression, even if based on life-long study,
and even if correct, is not enough for true science. An impression is not self-controlledly
produced which is the special characteristic of scientific inquiry. Impressions are derived
directly from intuitive feelings and the estimation of their validity is beyond rational self-
control.9 Thus, if we use Peirce’s writings as a guideline to semiotic concepts, we must first
9 This claim is acceptable only if considered from the momentary point of view. According to Peirce, not all of our
instinctive intuitions are ‘innate’, we have also acquired habits and some of them can be the results of rational
inquiry. In that sense, we may have ‘rationalized’ beliefs and feelings. However, when we adopt some result of
rational inquiry as our habit of action, i.e. when we are driven to believe in it, it is shifted from the theoretical
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consider under what science he is talking about. Secondly, we must consider what cognitive
status he himself attaches to his statements, i.e. whether they are proofs, beliefs, opinions,
guesses, or impressions, and whether he loaded them with possible scientific or practical
value. Thirdly, whenever he gives some arguments for his conceptions, we must consider
what their real validity and applicability are. In addition, we must take account that many of
Peirce’s writings are non-published and unfinished drafts, and as such, they do not necessarily
contain the thoroughly studied conceptions but provisional stages of thoughts under
development. It is our task to choose which concepts and conceptions are the most justified
and grounded independently on his own non-scientific beliefs, opinions, and impressions.
Therefore, it should be more than clarifying to apply Peirce’s own methodological principles
— especially his pragmaticism (but also ‘the ethics of terminology’)—  to his writings.
1.3. Applying Pragmaticism to Semiotic Concepts
The core of Peirce’s pragmaticism as a methodology is its definition of the intellectual (or
rational) meaning of concepts, the famous “pragmatic maxim”:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the object. (CP 5.402, 1878.)10
The intellectual meaning of Peirce’s concept of sign lies then in its conceivable practical
bearings (for ‘purposive action’) i.e. in its possible applications. If we look at Peirce’s own
examples and illustrative applications of signs, which he drew in order to make his
conceptions more understandable, it is remarkable that almost exclusively they concern
human cognition: perception, thought, and its transformation in (both internal and
intersubjective) communication. Even the most famous of his rare examples about possible
non-human representations, the turning of a sunflower towards the sun, was used to
demonstrate whether there are any genuine representamens that are not signs. A sign was
defined (in that context) as “a Representamen with a mental Interpretant” (Peirce CP 2.274,
1903). Moreover, throughout his career, Peirce considered signs of human cognition in
context of or in relation to scientific inquiry. The steps of scientific investigation were
presented as the special case or ‘the highest rank’ of human cognition (cf. the methods of
settling opinion, for instance, in EP 1:115-123, 1877). A strong impression can not be
avoided that Peirce’s main motivation and purpose for the theory of signs was to develop
‘logic of sciences’ and that his concept of sign was primarily even designed for that purpose
(cf. W 1:165,322-329, 1865). However, this ‘design’ (if there is such) and his possible other
purposes or intentions do not determine the whole meaning of the concept (but can give us
sphere onto a practical one. Though such beliefs are produced self-controlledly, their use is no more self-
controlled —  they are, in practice, dogmatically accepted. (Cf. EP 2:32-34,40-41,337.)
10 Notice the difference from the loosely pragmatist (like Wittgensteinian) idea of meaning as use. In Peirce’s
pragmaticism, the meaning of a concept is not found in its actual application to action or use (though it may
serve as a test of the truth of a conception). Instead, a meaning is 1) a conception about 2) the all
3) conceivable, i.e. possible, potential, or expectable 4) practical effects of the object of the original
conception, ‘practical’ referring to events that could be recognized or ‘verified’ independently on their
becoming as the effects of the concept.
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only a hint about it). If we want, we can extend Peirce’s concept of sign to cover a much
wider domain than he himself did.
Because the intellectual meaning is defined in terms of ‘conceivable practical bearings’,
this definition can be characterized as an effort towards better control over the potential
interpretants of the conception in focus. However, it is noticeable that in the definition, those
‘practical bearings’ are the ones of the object — i.e. the referent— of the conception. Thus, in
order to determine the pragmatic meaning of the concept of sign, we need a control over the
intended (or assumed) objects of the concept of sign too. The reason for the importance of
getting a proper picture about the class of the referents of the concept of sign is that for
Peirce, scientific concepts cannot be accepted merely as (culturally or intuitively) ‘given’.
Culturally ‘given’ everyday concepts are too vague for scientific use —  scientific concepts
have to be derived from certain kinds of observation. This hidden demand for control over the
formation of our concepts is underlined in another formulation of the maxim of pragmaticist:
The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and
make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both
those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
Thus, in order to avoid ‘unclear and nonsensical hypotheses’ in semiotics, we need also
to ask what kind of ‘perception’ or observation the elements of Peirce’s conception of sign
are based on, i.e. how they were (or can be) derived. This should reveal what the intended
object of the concept of sign is. It will turn out that especially we should ask, what the
intended object of the concept of the object of sign is.11
After these considerations, we have much better possibilities to control the application of
semiotic concepts in biosemiotics. I am driven to suggest the much narrower interpretation of
Peirce’s concept of triadic sign than be, perhaps, usually suggested. But this interpretation is
based on Peirce’s own self-understanding about what kind of sciences he was actually
practicing.
2. SIGN AND THOUGHT AS LOGICAL CONCEPTS
2.1. Logic and Thought in Terms of General Semiotic
Though Peirce made contributions in numbers of different scientific disciplines, it is not
an exaggeration to say that logic rises above all others (cf. Fisch 1982: xviii-xxiv). Unlike in
contemporary semiotics in general, the Peircean triadic sign with object and interpretant was
essentially born and raised as a logical concept —  not as a metaphysical, linguistic, social,
cultural, or psychological one. Throughout his career, he constantly classified his semeiotic as
his theory of normative logic. Thus, it is more than relevant to explore what Peirce’s
conception of logic consists of.
Traditionally, logic has been characterized as an art of reasoning (cf. EP 2:11, 1895) or a
kind of rational way of thinking. Peirce, however, wanted to develop logic as a science of
11 Here, we should be careful of not confusing the object of the concept of sign with the concept of the object of
sign (and with the object of the concept of the object of sign).
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reasoning, not an art or practice. ‘Logic’ is the name12 of a philosophical science that should
provide theories about the art of reasoning (e.g. EP 2:30, 1898). The object of logical studies,
reasoning is a certain kind of thought or thinking. But thought is, in itself, quite an abstract
and vague concept, which is hard to grasp because of its internal, immaterial, temporary, and
flexible characters. The 20th century western philosophy, almost every branch of it,13 has tried
to solve this problem by making a ‘linguistic turn’, by considering only linguistically
expressible thoughts and language as the medium of thought. Peirce strove for a more general
solution, to found the science of semiotic that would consider also other than mere linguistic
signs as the possible media of thought.
Peirce had a number of reasons to think that thought and signs are intertwined. Firstly, as
a starting point to the concept of sign, the peculiar character of signs was defined to be exactly
their ability to mediate thought or meaning. Secondly, he insisted that only embodied
thoughts can be considered and that the embodiment of thought is a sign (EP 2:256, 1903).
Thirdly, from the very beginning of his philosophy, Peirce opposed all forms of foundational
intuitionism. He forcefully argued that no intuition, any more sensuous than intellectual,
could guarantee an unconditionally or absolutely certain foundation for knowledge. If all
‘intuition’, i.e. direct or non-mediated reference to the object of thought, is impossible, as
Peirce argued, all thought have to be mediated by signs (cf. CP 5.213-215, 251-253, 1868).
Thus, Peirce concluded that traditional logic, or the emerging modern logic, should be
expressed in terms of general semiotic.
2.2. What Kind of Science Is Logic in Relation with Other Sciences?
In Peirce’s general conception of science, science was defined as a special type of
(human) action, as ongoing investigation, as what the researching scientists de facto do. No
established collection of truths already acquired could by itself define a science. Instead, a
science became identified with an existing scientific community, the members of which have
joint aims, standards, and methods for their research. (CP 1.122-124, 1902, CP 4.9, 1906, cf.
Fisch 1986: 340, Kent 1987: 81-82.) In this sense, Peirce classified logic as a theoretical,
positive, philosophical, and normative science —  i.e. as a science that seeks true propositions
about the facts of the real world, the propositions that are derived from and tested with the
observations of common experience and that concern the criteria of validity:
As already noted, Peirce took logic as a Science of reasoning and not as an Art.
Depending on their ultimate purpose, sciences were further divided into theoretical and
practical and logic was defined as a theoretical one. Practical sciences develop theories
12 Peirce mostly uses the term ‘logic’ as the name of the science and not to refer to its object of study which is
another common use of the term ‘logic’ (e.g. in phrases ‘women’s logic’ or ‘logic of the universe’). Logic in
this latter sense is, especially if considered as a description of a real phenomenon, rather a question of
metaphysics or psychical sciences than of logical science (cf. Chapter 2.3).
13 The main exceptions are classical pragmatism (Peirce, James, and Dewey) and the phenomenology e.g. of
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (perhaps also some neo-Kantians should be mentioned). Most of the other major
philosophical schools have gone through the ‘linguistic turn’: the analytic philosophy (e.g. Russell,
Wittgenstein, and Carnap) and the so-called ‘neo-pragmatism’ (e.g. Quine, Rorty, and Putnam) as well as
‘German’ hermeneutics (e.g. Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas) and ‘French’ structuralism and semiotics
including post-structuralism (e.g. Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Barthes, and Derrida). What is characteristic of this
‘linguistic turn’, or for the most of its representatives, is that social communication is incontestably assumed to
be the primary function of language.
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ultimately for some practical purposes that are ulterior to them (EP 2:458, 1911), such as
advancement in skills, wealth, powers, human welfare, or entertainment. In theoretical
sciences, instead, mere truth about the object of an investigation is the ultimate criterion for
the successfulness of that investigation.14 Thus, no purposes ulterior to a logical investigation
itself should be counted when the validity of logical theory is judged.
By determining logic as positive and philosophical, Peirce wanted to distinguish it from
mathematics and special sciences. Mathematics, theoretical philosophy, and special sciences
are the three main classes of theoretical sciences15 divided according to the kind of
observations they employ in their search of truth (about their objects). This division is
essential to keep in mind, since we are interested in the kind of observation from which Peirce
derived his concept of sign.
1. Pure mathematics is based on the observation of imagined objects without any
guarantee of their application in the actual world. It can describe only the possible
forms that things (including thought) may take in our universe. It is a pure science of
hypotheses providing no positive information about the actual reality of our
universe. As such it is the negative science. (CP 2.782, 1901, CP 1.247, 2.77, 1902.)
2. Theoretical philosophy draws its conclusions from the observation of universal
phenomena that “come within the range of every man's normal experience, and for
the most part in every waking hour of his life” (CP 1.241, 1902). The findings of
philosophy should thus be derivable from familiar experience common to everyone.
3. Special sciences are based on the special experience aided with instruments and
other special arrangements and on the analysis of its minute details. Special sciences
discover new phenomena by expanding the ordinary limits of human experience.16
Unlike mathematics, both philosophy and special sciences refer to some positive facts of
our actual world being thus positive sciences. These divisions form a hierarchical
classification of different species of theoretical sciences. The most abstract class consists of
(pure) mathematics, since any fact of the actual world is always a possible one too, i.e. it
manifests one possible mathematical form. Theoretical philosophy, in turn, is more abstract
than special sciences, because the universal experience that philosophy observes should be
present in any experience, also in those special experiences within which special sciences
14 Naturally, truth can be a goal in practical sciences too, but only a useful truth, useful in relation to some practical
needs or ends.
15 From 1902 onward, Peirce recognized two subbranches of theoretical sciences: the sciences of discovery and of
review. These three classes are the ones of the sciences of discovery. All considerations that relate different
sciences in general, also this classification of sciences, belong to the sciences of review. Practical philosophy
(e.g. ethics in conventional sense) is not a theoretical science but belongs under practical sciences.
16 The special sciences consist of two subclasses, physical and psychical. The difference between physical and
psychical special sciences is that ‘physics’ sets forth the workings of efficient causation and ‘psychics’ of final
causation (CP 1.242, 1902). Physical and psychical phenomena are not independent on each other since Peirce
did not see final and efficient causation as alternatives, but some chain of efficient causes is always involved in
any event guided by a final cause (cf. CP 1.212, 1902). To accommodate biosemiotics into this classification
would be a tricky task. If it manages to study the special phenomena of life, it would seem to belong under
physical special sciences (the one of biology). On the other hand, biosemiotics, being a science of mind in
biological phenomena, should be classified as a psychical science. Thus, biosemiotics would be a kind of
‘psychical natural science’, but only if it really succeeds in explaining biological phenomena. The proper place
of biosemiotics as a science — or whether it is a science at all—  depends ultimately on its actual content,
which is not yet settled.
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operate. The order of classification follows the abstractness of the objects of study specific to
each science (CP 1.180, 1903). Lower sciences (the objects of which are less abstract) rest for
their principles upon (some of) the higher ones that, in turn, draw their data in part from the
lower ones and furnish them with applications. (EP 2:35, 1898, EP 2:458, 1911, cf. also Kent
1987: 18.) Thus, for Peirce, logic should be completely independent on metaphysical (cf. the
next chapter), psychological, sociological, and linguistic principles and studies.
Theoretical sciences
Mathematics Philosophy
Logic Metaphysics
Special
sciences
‘Physics’
‘Psychics’
Practical
sciences
(including e.g.
- engineering
- medical sci.
- conventional
   ethics)
Degree of abstractness of the objects of study (i.e. of observed objects)
high
low
Figure 2. Overview to Peirce’s ‘early’ conception about the relations of sciences (before c. 1902)
All the positive sciences apply mathematical formalisms in their own fields (cf. CP 1.133,
1894). Especially logic employs mathematical theories to such an extent that formal logic
may appear as if it were a branch of mathematics. But logic is defined principally as a
philosophical science and not as a formal one (cf. also CP 4.240, 1902):
Pure deductive logic, insofar as it is restricted to mathematical hypotheses, is, indeed,
mere mathematics. But when logic tells us that we can reason about the real world in the same
way with security, it tells us a positive fact about the universe. (CP 7.524, undated)
We can see that the ‘positivity’ of logic is emptied in its normative character —  when it
says that a reasoning is correct or incorrect (logically valid or invalid). This prescriptive
character of logic is traditionally expressed by calling logic as one of the normative sciences
(other two being ethics and esthetics, cf. Ch. 5.1) in contradistinction to psychology that is
commonly taken as a descriptive science of the special phenomenon of mind and thought.17
The central task of logic as a normative science is to exhibit the criteria for the validity of
reasoning —  to establish and justify the norms of good thinking at the general, formal level.
According to that normativity, any inference, interpretation, or transformation of signs should
be able to judge either correct or fallacious, either good or bad. Moreover, in order to be truly
normative, there should always be a real possibility for misinterpretation, for incorrect,
fallacious, or unsuccessful transformation of signs. A correct interpretation can not be a
necessary outcome. There are no real norms without ‘freedom to choose for bad’.18
17 The logical anti-psychologicism was a common trend among the pioneers of modern logic (1850-1930) despite
their disagreements on the relation of logic to mathematics and metaphysics, for instance.
18 According to Peirce: “It is idle to criticize as good or bad that which cannot be controlled. (… ) To criticize as
logically sound or unsound an operation of thought that cannot be controlled is not less ridiculous than it
would be to pronounce the growth of your hair to be morally good or bad.” (CP 5.108-9, 1903.) Hoffmeyer’s
Limitations on Applying Peircean Semeiotic 279
2.3. The Relation of Logic, Metaphysics, and Biosemiotics
Before about the year 1902, Peirce saw theoretical philosophy consisting of only two
disciplines: the normative science of logic and the descriptive one of metaphysics. The task of
metaphysics is to describe the most general facts of the (actual) universe in so far as they can
be inferred from philosophical observation, i.e. from common experience. The relation
between logic and metaphysics deserves a special attention, because our quest for biosemiotic
realism (or materialism) forces us to use the concept of sign as a metaphysical concept. We
are looking for real sign-actions that are what they are independently on our opinions. Logic
proper does not deal with the questions about the external applicability or realness of its
concepts. Even if biosemiotics were characterized as ‘objective logic’ (as I unfortunately did
in Vehkavaara 2002: 304, see Chapter 5), the ‘logic’ of any objectively cognizable real
processes that are external to the observing mind would not belong to logic proper. Such
study is not normative but descriptive of ‘natural normativity’ (at its best). It could not be
more than an application of logical (or mathematical) concepts in metaphysics —  or in
special sciences.19
Peirce’s conception of logic as a principally philosophical science corresponds with the
Kantian notion of transcendental logic although it is certainly not transcendental in the sense
that it would give any foundational status to the ‘transcendental necessities’. Peirce was
utterly critical toward all kinds of a priori ‘necessitarianism’ (cf. EP 1:298-311, 1892). Those
‘positive facts’ that logic can tell us about are nevertheless transcendental in such weaker
sense that they concern the form of our internal epistemic relation with the world we live.20
The source of this somewhat ‘transcendental’ character of logic is the kind of observation that
philosophy is based on. Because logic should be derivable from any experience (plus
mathematics), i.e. from familiar every day experience, it becomes intimately bound with ‘our’
perspective and ordinary life. At the same time, its concepts and propositions have to be
abstracted so far that they are applicable almost everywhere in one way or another. The
typical source of error is that the concepts of logical theory are not abstracted enough but are
implicitly left unnecessarily concrete or intricate (cf. CP 2.75, 1902).
Like logic, also metaphysics appeals only to familiar experience (and mathematics), but it
is far more suspicious how it could say anything at all about the whole reality on such
experiential basis. A special problem is that according to the pragmaticist definition (see
Chapter 1.2), the meaning of propositions consists of their ‘conceivable practical bearings’
introduction of the term ‘semiotic freedom’ is particularly felicitous in this respect (cf. Hoffmeyer 1996: 61-66
and 1997a).
19 According to Beverley Kent (1987: 213-215), Peirce used the term ‘objective logic’ to refer to his own work only
occasionally and not consistently. Mostly, Peirce referred by term ‘objective logic’ to the doctrine that
corresponds to Hegel’s objective logic (cf. CP 2.111, 1902, or CP 6.218, 1898), which is clearly a
metaphysical doctrine (in Peircean sense).
20 This captures the core of the Kantian sense of the term ‘transcendental’ though Peirce would probably not have
described it referring to the conditions of all possible experiences but rather to what is inherent in any actual
experience. In addition, he rejected Kantian talk about “Dinge an sich selbst” (at least, if they are taken as
“absolutely incognizable”, cf. CP 5.254-258, 1868). However, in his early phase, Peirce was heavily
influenced by Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/1787). His ‘new list of categories’ (EP 1:1-10, 1867)
was intended to reform Kant’s categories of understanding, i.e. his transcendental logic, and the relation of
logic to metaphysics is the same as in Kant’s critical philosophy. Nevertheless, Peirce himself used the term
‘transcendental’ to refer only to the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, etc. but never to his own one.
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and these if any are hard to distinguish between alternative doctrines of metaphysics. 21
Moreover, how can it even derive its concepts from ordinary experience? It is not the
metaphysical reasoning, but it “is the metaphysical concepts which it is difficult to
apprehend” (EP 2:31, 1898). Peirce found no other possibility that metaphysics gets its
concepts by adapting the logical ones. Thus, logic appears as a more abstract science than
metaphysics (CP 6.1-5, 1898). This dependence has a few corollaries that we must take into
account:
1. Metaphysics is by no means the ‘first’ of sciences, but quite contrary, the last of the
sciences of theoretical philosophy —  the one whose possibility and scientificity
have to be established.
2. Peirce’s metaphysical conceptions were far less secure than the ones of his logic —
their scientific or epistemic status were more or less a mere ‘guess’ or the ‘Grand
hypothesis’.
3. Peircean metaphysics gets the similar ‘transcendental’ character as logic. As it
draws its positive content only from the universal features of ordinary experience,
the most general facts that it describes must concern their accessibility to us, i.e. the
form that they ‘necessarily’ take in our mind (independently on their more concrete
content). For instance, in his paper “Evolutionary Love” (EP 1:352-371, 1893),
Peirce demonstrates there being three kinds of evolution (by fortuitous variation, by
mechanical necessity, and by creative love) that all are real powers of the world.
They are, however, only three possible forms that real processes may take, three real
possibilities that should not be excluded a priori when some specific real process is
investigated. Whether or not an individual process (be it chemical, geological,
celestial, phylogenetic, epigenetic, metabolic, psychodynamic, communicative, etc.)
is dominated by ‘creative love’, for instance, is not properly a metaphysical quarrel.
It is dependent on the observation of that special phenomenon and therefore belongs
under the appropriate special science.
These corollaries have severe consequences to biosemiotics, since it is evident that in the
biosemiotics of ‘Copenhagen school’, Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics22 is found more
inspiring (though not always unconditionally accepted) than his semiotic logic. Consequently,
the reading of Peirce’s texts is filtered by metaphysical goggles (which is by no means merely
biosemiotic vice), some of his logical conceptions tend to be taken as if they were
metaphysical ones, and the epistemic statuses of his metaphysical conceptions are easily
overemphasized. This is the first pitfall that should be cautioned.
21 In order to be scientific, also metaphysical statements should be fallible, i.e. experimentally testable, which is a
demand quite hard to fulfill: “a metaphysician who infers anything about a life beyond grave can never find
out that his inference is false until he has gone out of metaphysical business, at his present stand, at least” (EP
2:30, 1898).
22 See Brier (2003: 74-75), Emmeche (2004: 118), and Hoffmeyer (1996: 16-18,23-27 and 1998). Among the most
celebrated metaphysical doctrines (whether or not accepted) are‘synechism’ that “being is a matter of more or
less” (the principle of continuity, EP 2: 2, 1893), ‘tychism’ (or anti-necessitarianism) that pure chance is one
effective cause (EP 1:313, 1892), ‘agapism’ that ‘creative love’, i.e. co-operation (as symbiosis, self-
organization, or meta-system transition) is a real evolutionary force and irreducible to natural selection (EP 1:
360-362), such objective idealism “that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws” (EP
1:293, 1891), and the general principle that “nature has tendency to take habits” (e.g. Hoffmeyer 1996: 27, cf.
EP 1:296-297, 1891).
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In principle, the biosemiotic tendency to treat basically logical concepts (e.g. sign) as
metaphysical ones is well in accordance with Peirce’s own view. However, it seems that the
used concept of sign is not derived form Peirce’s detailed logical description of sign-action
(cf. Ch. 3.4). Instead, it is taken as a vague metaphysical entity characterized superficially by
the vague ideas of mediation, progression or intentionality, and triadicity. Quite commonly in
biosemiotic literature, it is left unspecified (or the specification is clearly unjustified) what is
the object or the interpretant of the considered sign and who (or what) is the ‘interpreter’ that
executes the sign-transformation. Thus, the excess vagueness of the adopted metaphysical
concepts and doctrines, that makes them incapable of explaining (or even describing)
anything,23 is another pitfall that should be avoided (if biosemiotics is going to be a science).
The third pitfall is that we may be drifted to pronounce unnecessarily strong
metaphysical statements (as in physiosemiotics, cf. Ch. 6). As such they are often either
simply false or even if true, so weekly justified (if justified at all) that others do not have
much reasons to become convinced of their truth. The proclamation of unnecessarily strong
statements is strategically unwise if weaker claims are sufficient for making biosemiotics.
The fourth pitfall is that we are driven to believe our metaphysical convictions as a
doctrine, not as the hypotheses or ends but as the principles or starting points of biosemiotic
inquiry. Conceptions that are ultimately based on ‘seemings’, intuitions, or mere reference to
Peirce’s authority cannot form a science. Independently on the acceptance of the Peircean
idea that specifically logic should be the source of metaphysical concepts (it is not the only
possibility), it can nevertheless be demanded that their acceptance should be somehow
theoretically reasoned. Arguments for metaphysical conceptions should ultimately appeal to
truth. If the only legitimation of accepted metaphysical principles were their practical
convenience, i.e. that they seem to have consequences that are politically, morally,
esthetically, or religiously convenient, economically profitable, or only entertaining, the
acceptance of metaphysics would be a mere ideological choice. And if biosemiotics is relying
on that, it too is vitiated to mere ideology.
However, whether the pure theoretical metaphysics is possible as a science (and how it is
if it is), is happily a question that a biosemiotician does not have to solve. He/she is interested
mainly in the biosemiotic application of semiotic concepts and no strict demarcation between
the metaphysical and biological concepts is necessary. The shift from a logical concept to a
metaphysical one is nevertheless far from a trivial one. The only possibility to get a
sufficiently definite metaphysical concept of sign that can be justifiably applied in biological
phenomena is to explore the corresponding logical concept, if the Peircean concept and
starting point are seen at all promising.
2.4. What Is the Object of Logical Inquiry?
The object of study in logical science is traditionally thought to be reasoning, i.e. rational
thinking. As we already noticed (in Ch. 2.1), Peirce concretized the study of thought being
study of signs, whatever the proper concept of sign proves to be. Nevertheless, because of the
demand for rationality, not all thinking, streams of consciousness or chains of intuitive
23 “It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme. Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition to be
certain. It is equally easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague.” (CP 4.237, 1902.)
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associations, even if mediated by signs, can be counted as the object of logic.24 Thought has
to be deliberate or self-controlled in order to be rational: “Logic is the theory of self-
controlled, or deliberate, thought” (CP 1.191, 1903). Mere outer control is not enough,
otherwise the thinking of a successfully brainwashed man during the brainwash would be
reasoning. Mere feeling of reasonableness — that a brainwashed man may feel—  does not
make thinking reasoning.25 Instead, reasoning must involve a thought that controls itself.
What kind of thought can be thought to control itself? It is a thought that knows itself or at
least seeks to know itself, its conditions to be that particular thought, a thought that seeks to
know the truth about its object. This kind of argumentation establishes the link from
rationality to self-controlling via deliberateness. Rational thought has to be at least deliberate,
and in order to be thoroughly deliberate, a thought ought to contain full consciousness about
itself, and therefore it needs to seek the truth about its object.
This is the original prototype of the concept of triadic sign. Logic can be specified as a
truth-seeking theory of (such) signs that tend to find truth about their objects.26 We get the
‘logic in narrow sense’:
[L]ogic in the narrow sense, or Critical Logic, is the theory of the general conditions of
the reference of Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, it is the theory of
the conditions of truth. (CP 2.93, 1902)
This ‘critical logic’ or ‘logical critic’ is nevertheless only ‘logic in the narrow sense’
while the scope of semeiotic — or of general theory of signs—  must be much broader. In
order to find out what the objects of Peirce’s ‘logic in the broad sense’ are and how broad it
is, we have to explore what kind of observation the concept of sign was based on and how
Peirce derived the concept from that observation. The original observational source does not
in itself limit the application of the concept —  the concept is after all an abstracted one. They
are the hidden presuppositions of the derivation that limit the application, and since the
derivation of a concept means its construction, some of these presuppositions become built
into the concept.
3. DERIVATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF SIGN
3.1. The Original Derivation of the Concept of Sign —  The Aim Toward
Truth Built in the Triadic Structure of Sign
Peirce embraced the semiotic point of view already in 1865 (cf. W 1:162-336), but at the
beginning, the concept of sign was treated as a more or less intuitive (or traditional) concept
(cf. Bergman 2003, 3). His first actual derivation of the concept — i.e. of its triadic
24 Peirce’s one early characterization of logic is following: “Logic is the study of the laws of signs so far as these
denote things —  those laws of signs which determine what things they denote and what they do not” (W 3:98,
1873).
25 Peirce criticized heavily ‘German logicians’ and especially Christopher Sigwart for basing the logical validity
ultimately on ‘logical feeling’(logische Gefühl). Instead, Peirce consistently claimed that the criterion for the
logical validity of thinking is a matter of fact, not of feeling or intuition. (CP 5.85-87, 1903.)
26 Notice that truth appears here at two different levels: at the ‘meta-level’, our purpose in logic (because it is a
theoretical science) is to search truth about the ‘object-level’ tendency toward truth.
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structure—  was made in his first published philosophical contribution, “On the New List of
Categories” (EP 1:1-10, 1867). We can observe that his original method of deriving the
triadic concept of sign — as a side-product of the derivation of his three logical categories—
accords well with his conception about reasoning as self-controlled thought. The
argumentation starts from the analysis of proposition (or ‘conception’) by directing an
investigating thought into itself in order to find out how it can refer to its object
(‘substance’/grammatical subject) and state something (‘being’/ grammatical predicate) about
it (i.e. how it can ‘unite manifold sensuous impressions’). The execution of the derivation
proceeds as a kind of on-line process of self-referential self-awareness about the present
thought. A present thought is directed to observe itself, i.e. directed toward its origin, toward
its object, to find truth about it, and at the same time, it is transformed into another more self-
aware thought-sign about itself, into its interpretant. This way the interpretant of a
proposition-sign presents itself as a mediator, or as a mediating representation that connects
the representamen to its object. The procedure can be repeated by taking the interpretant as a
new representamen that is connected to the object by a new interpretant-sign and so on. The
interpretant is produced as a means of grasping the true knowledge about the object of
thought-sign, as a means for a thought to take a full control over itself.
Object
RepresentamenInter-
pretant1Inter-
pretant2
reference
‘self-inspection’
Figure 3. Peircean sign from the transcendental perspective
We can call the way of the execution of this derivation as a transcendental perspective.27
The term ‘transcendental perspective’ is used here to refer to internalist, epistemic, atemporal,
and the first-person point of view, the transcendental statements referring to ‘our’ possible
means and ways of cognition, and the argumentation relying either on the ‘on-line’ self-
reference or on some presumably intuitive necessity. The transcendental perspective produces
a derivation from the perspective of a sign itself, it produces a self-referential thought process
where investigating thought (‘the agent of derivation’) and a thought (or a sign) investigated
(‘derived concept’) are identical or conflated.
The derivation of the concept of sign consists of the construction of the concepts of
representamen, object, and interpretant and their irreducible triadic coalition as a sign.
Because the interpretant is constructed by looking for truth about the object, the aim toward
truth — the logical normativity—  is already built in the construction of the triadic structure of
27 This is somewhat misleading nomination, since Peirce’s philosophy is ‘transcendental’ only in certain restricted
sense (see Chapter 2.3). Peirce derived his categories and the concept of sign in order to answer the
transcendental question ‘how the synthetical judgements are at all possible’, which is a modification of
corresponding Kantian question "How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?" According to Peirce,
instead of asking for the possibility of synthetical judgments a priori, Kant should have asked for the
possibility of synthetical judgments in general. (CP 2.690, 1877.)
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sign, no matter how it will be considered or what will be considered in it. The transcendental
concept of triadic sign is derived as a logical concept —  it is based on logical observation.
Especially the concepts of the object and interpretant of sign are defined exclusively as
logical concepts. Consequently, the truth as the ultimate goal of sign-process is not only the
matter of Critical Logic, logic in the narrow sense, but it is inbuilt to any such departments of
semiotic that uses this concept of sign as its basic concept. Truth belongs to the substantial
matters of logic in the broad sense that consists of the whole ‘philosophical trivium’:
Speculative Grammar, Critical Logic, and Speculative Rhetoric (CP 1.444, c. 1896).
Speculative Grammar (later also ‘Stoicheiology’, CP 4.9, 1906) studies “the general
conditions of signs being signs” (CP 1.444, c. 1896). One of these conditions is that signs
have to be capable of being true, i.e. true representations of their objects, and that their
misinterpretation is possible (otherwise, there would be no real normativity). It is Peirce’s
equivalent to philosophical epistemology.28 Speculative Rhetoric, which Peirce later renamed
as Methodeutic, studies “the laws of the evolution of thought,” which coincides “with the
study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind,
and from one state of mind to another” (CP 1.444, c. 1896). I.e. it studies the force of signs,
how signs would come true, as strategies for choosing promising hypothesis.29 The definition
of logic or formal semiotic as a theory of self-controlled thought is its definition in broad
sense (CP 1.191, 1903). Logic is in a broad sense a normative science, and the logical
normativity, logical goodness is truth.
If all above is correct, only those signs that are able to tend toward truth about their
objects can be justifiably said to be proper objects of Peirce’s concept of sign. If semiotic is
supposed to be more extensive than what mere logic (in the broad sense) consists of, the
needed broader notion of sign needs another derivation or else it remains merely at the level
of vague intuitive idea. Especially, the concepts of object and interpretant can not justifiably
be applied to such non-logical notion of sign without another derivation.
3.2. Objective Perspective
The original derivation of the concept of sign appeared strangely as a kind of culmination
of Peirce’s early semiotic inquiries. His use of semiotic terminology practically ends (with
minor exceptions) in 1867 for about 25 years.30 However, during that long non-semiotic
28 “It is generally admitted that there is a doctrine which properly antecedes what we have called critic. It considers,
for example, in what sense and how there can be any true proposition and false proposition, and what are the
general conditions to which thought or signs of any kind must conform in order to assert anything. Kant, who
first raised these questions to prominence, called this doctrine transcendentale Elementarlehre, and made it a
large part of his Critic of the Pure Reason. But the Grammatica Speculativa of Scotus is an earlier and
interesting attempt. The common German word is Erkenntnisstheorie, sometimes translated Epistemology.”
(From entry “Logic” in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1901, ed. James Mark Baldwin, CP 2.206.)
29 “It is further generally recognized that another doctrine follows after critic, and which belongs to, or is closely
connected with, logic. Precisely what this should contain is not agreed; but it must contain the general
conditions requisite for the attainment of truth. Since it may be held to contain more, one hesitates to call it
heuristic. It is often called Method; but as this word is also used in the concrete, methodic or methodeutic
would be better.” (From entry “Logic” in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1901, ed. James Mark
Baldwin, CP 2.207.)
30 See Bergman (2003) and Deledalle (2000: 58). The major exception is Peirce’s 1872-1873 Logic (W 3:14-108)
but from 1873 to 1894, Peirce does not seem to use the word ‘representamen’ at all and the word ‘sign’ is used
only in its non-technical ordinary meaning.
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slumber, a new perspective was gradually adopted so that when Peirce reintroduced the
semiotic inquiries in 1894, it started to develop toward a new direction.
The new perspective that Peirce adopted can be named as the objective perspective,
because within it, a sign is no more considered merely from the perspective of its own, but the
whole chain of signs, the whole semiosic process or succession of signs, is taken as an object
of study. A present investigating thought in observer’s head is no more considered as a part of
the object of study —  it is not the interpretant of the signs of the process under investigation.
Instead, the mind is methodically split into the ‘observed-mind’ and ‘observer-mind’. The
agent of interpretation and the agent of consideration of that semiotic process are
distinguished —  the terms used here are ‘object-agent’ and ‘meta-agent’ (cf. Vehkavaara
2002: 299-300). The adoption of this new perspective does not necessarily reject the results of
transcendental inquiries — the basic description of the concept of sign was still irreducibly
triadic—  but its main addition and benefit is a possibility to adopt a temporal perspective so
that the difference between atemporal ‘sign-objects’ and temporal ‘sign-actions’ can be made
(cf. Deledalle 2000: 38-39). The focus was no more on the ‘static’ transcendental question
about how the representative relation was possible, i.e. how a connection (or ‘unity’) is
brought between a representamen and its object. Instead of describing an interpretant as
mediating (‘logico-transcendentally’) between a representamen and its object, the
representamen was described as mediating (‘semio-dynamically’) information from the
object to the interpretants. The main attention was shifted from sign-objects to sign-processes,
from the past causes to future effects of a sign.31
For biosemiotic application, the introduction of the objective perspective is more than a
welcome occasion. The objective perspective does not make possible only the retrospective
(or prospective) consideration of meta-agent’s own past (or future) thoughts. The objective
perspective is not only a tool for self-examination, but it makes possible some kind of
epistemology or logic ‘of the other one’32 too, which is a precondition of any realistic
biosemiotics. It is the objective perspective involved in biosemiotics that frees us to talk and
think about non-human minds and non-conscious sign processes in terms of Peircean
semeiotic. In one form or another, the objective perspective, even if not recognized, is
inevitable in biosemiotics —  an organism or any other such biofunctional unit that
(presumably) has some semiotic activity is the object-agent and its semiotic activity is studied
by a biosemiotician, by a human meta-agent.33
The objective perspective raises a question that the point of view of the transcendental
perspective can not raise similarly. Sign-processes are always somehow ‘lawful’, habitual, or
directed phenomena —  a completely accidental or random output cannot be said to be an
interpretation. The habit that governs the interpretation must be embodied somewhere, it must
have some existing carrier that is observed, when actual sign-processes are considered.
Therefore, the question about the identity and the characters of the object-agent, i.e. the
interpreter, the semiotic agent, or the ‘system of interpretance’, arises. We have to ask, for
31 Peirce’s change in perspective may be affected by reading (at the latest in 1879) of the Epicurean philosopher
Philodemus who frequently used the term ‘semeiosis’ (‘sign-action’) and whose main view to it was “from the
side of the interpretant” while Peirce’s original view was from the side of the sign itself (Fisch 1986: 329-330).
32 The term ‘epistemology of the other one’ (sometimes also ‘phenomenology of the other one’) is coined by
evolutionary epistemologist D.T. Campbell. (Campbell 1966 and 1988, cf. Vehkavaara 2002.)
33 Although I have suggested that certain kind of naturalization of semiotic concepts would be profitable in
biosemiotic science (Vehkavaara 2002: 295-297), the mere objective perspective as such does not presume or
suggest any kind of naturalization of concepts.
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whom a transformation of signs is and can be normative and meaningful. What characters and
structure must this semiotic agent have? Moreover, what could the internal normativity or
meaningfulness be for that agent, especially if the agent is not an individual human being?34
The question about the interpreter does not arise similarly in the transcendental
perspective, because it makes no distinction between object-agent and meta-agent (or they are
conflated). The transcendental perspective is self-referential in the sense that the investigating
thought is the interpretant of the investigated sign. However, such ‘perspective of a sign
itself’ is possible only through the (implicit) assumption about some kind of general
‘transcendental subjectivity’ or ‘ego’ and this implicit assumption makes transcendental
perspective completely inapplicable in realistic biosemiotics. It is exclusively a human
internalist perspective and assumes sign’s ability to self-control and conscious self-reference.
This cannot be expected to be found in the most of the other animals, not to mention
endosemiosis or the other much less analogous forms of life.
meta-agent
('observer/researcher')
the object-
agent (or its
representation)
represented
object (in the
Umwelt of the
object-agent)
meta-
agent
object-
agent
represented
object
confluence
‘transcendental ego’
observation
 (self-)
observation
inter-
action
(A) (B)
Figure 4. Observation from the objective perspective (A), and from the transcendental perspective (B)
3.3. The Second Derivation of the Concept of Sign
As we have seen, the initial prototype of sign, as a derived conception, did not primarily
refer to the idea of an external communicative sign, e.g. to letters, words, sentences, or to any
other linguistic or textual entities, but to the idea of a conception as a thought-sign. Even after
the reintroduction of semiotic inquiries within objective perspective, the prototype for the
concept of sign was still fixed on individual (human) cognition, on reasoning and learning
from perception. Not until 1907, 40 years after the original derivation, Peirce finally
composed another derivation of the concept of sign (EP 2:398-433, 1907, cf. also Bergman
2003: 9). Unlike the original one, this new derivation starts from the most ordinary and
familiar instances of those that are commonly used to think as signs. The new prototype of a
34 Because the objective perspective is based on sharp division between meta- and object-levels, it can be criticized
being non-self-critical from the transcendental point of view. But this non-self-criticalness is characteristic
only when a single study is concerned. It is always possible to generate another study from the objective
perspective that brings the meta-level observation of the first one under a critical inquiry. The division into
object- and meta-agents can be iterated.
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sign was, instead of a proposition as an internal thought-sign, a common sense conception of
an external communicative sign, an uttered and interpreted sign.
The new dialogic prototype for sign-action covers self-evidently all external signs used in
intersubjective communication. However, Peirce seems to suppose that it would offer a more
general starting point than the one in his original derivation of sign. He argued that it models
also the thought-signs, i.e. internal signs of intrasubjective communication: “a thought is itself
a sign, and should itself have an utterer (namely, the ego of a previous moment)” (EP 2:403,
1907). This emphasis on the self-experience of the ‘spitting of self’ in thought process is
evidently a consequence of the adoption of the temporal objective perspective to thought-
sign. The moment of the appearance of a representamen is already a past event when it is
recognized as a sign (of its object), i.e. at the moment of the construction of its interpretant.
The ‘ego’ that perceives the representamen (as it is) is slightly different than the ‘ego’ that
understands it as a sign. This latter more informed ego may start to explore — if being capable
and motivated—  the conditions of that perception considering the former ego as its object-
agent. As the self-reflective interpretation proceeds, this current meta-agent is reconsidered as
another object-agent by a new meta-agent, and so on, as long as the chain of thought
persists.35
Nevertheless, the common sense conception about communicative sign was — as such
conceptions always were for Peirce—  only a prototype, i.e. a starting point. Peirce explicitly
denied that he would investigate what is ordinarily meant by the term ‘sign’. Instead, he
wanted to define the concept of sign as such “what it were best, in reason, that it should
mean”, and not as such “what the definitum conventionally does mean”. Peirce intended to
abstract the essential characters of signs so that it would be “applicable to everything which
the most general science of s?meio´tic must regard its business to study” (EP 2:401-2, 1907).
The first reservation to the conventional starting point was that at least utterers are not
essential to all signs. For instance, natural signs (the symptoms of disease, the signs of
weather, etc.) have no utterer. But no more interpreters seem to be necessary to signs. Written
texts are signs even if they were never red or even if nobody was even capable of learning to
read that language anymore, as the case is in some ancient documents of lost civilizations.
(Cf. EP 2:404, 1907.) Still, all examples given by Peirce seem to assume either actual (or
past) utterer or actual interpreter. From these considerations, Peirce ends up to the notion that
35 It can be doubted whether the communicative prototype of sign is general enough. Even if it may be more general
than Peirce’s original propositional prototype of sign, perhaps some even more general idea of asocial
cognition is still required. Namely, the very idea of communication in itself — at least in the sense that Peirce
used it (cf. Ch. 3.5)—  presumes the idea of perception. What is not first perceived as a thing or an event
cannot be further recognized and interpreted as a sign. Perception, if any, is a form of individual cognition, and
according to Peirce himself, the only ultimate source of mental content, i.e. of the content of thought (EP
2:241, 1903). The problem is that Peirce appears somewhat ambivalent what comes to perception. On the one
hand, he seems to accept such common sense notion that percepts mediate information from environment to
organism, i.e. that they are in some sense signs (EP 2:328, 1904). On the other hand, the appearance of
percepts is completely uncontrolled by mind, they are ‘strange intruders’ that compulsively force themselves
to mind. Moreover, even the first conception of the content of a percept, a perceptual judgement, is
compulsively produced regardless of the fact that this process is nevertheless already a kind of abstraction.
Any perceptual judgement — that refers only to an individual percept—  contains some general elements that
are abstracted from that percept. (EP 2:227, 1903.) Because of the compulsive and uncontrolled character of
(the beginning of) perceptual process, at the moment of perception, a percept does not refer to anywhere, it
does not have an object, and therefore, it is not a sign. The process is not logical or even normative. Still, it
brings forth signs and interpretations that are the most significant for the agent of perception. What seems to
be missing is some more general analysis of perception and thought that would not be reduced to the purely
logical level. Some preliminaries to this are tried to develop in Chapter 5 and e.g. in Vehkavaara 2003.
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the object of sign is more characteristic of sign than the utterer itself. The object is present
even in cases with an absent utterer. The interpretation of natural signs, for instance, proceeds
as if there were some omniscient utterer who wants to give us a lesson about natural
phenomena. No difference in interpretation could be made. The object of sign is that which
the utterer — either actual or ‘as if’ utterer—  has had (or would have had) in his/her mind. It
is the essential ingredient of an utterer and its substitute when the utterer is absent. (EP 2:407,
1907).
Like the concept of object, Peirce introduced the interpretant to function as the substitute
and the essential ingredient of the interpreter. When a sign has no actual interpreter, the mode
of being of “its interpretant is a “would be,” i.e., what it would determine in the interpreter if
there were one” (EP 2:409, 1907). However, the sign’s relation with its utterer and interpreter
is not symmetrical. While the real utterer can be totally absent, the real interpreter cannot.
Although the actual interpreter is not required, some possible or ‘would be’ interpreter is
seemingly required. This ‘would be’ interpreter is not a mere empty shell, but it is implicitly
presumed to have such a minimal cognitive structure that makes it capable of interpreting the
sign in question. For instance, it has to be capable of perceiving those characters of the
representamen that connect the representamen to its object. Especially in biosemiotics, it is
evident that different ‘minds’ may have different capacities for perception and cognition —
they may have different Umwelts—  and therefore, it is relevant how the identity and
significant characters of this interpreting mind are explicated. In the generalized sense of
possible signs, everything can really be a sign, “all this universe is perfused with signs” (CP
5.448n1, 1906), i.e. every thing could become interpreted as a sign of something by some
‘would-be’ interpreter.36 However, if this possible interpreter does not become actualized, all
its interpretants will be doomed to remain in the universe of would be’s. There will be no
actual semiotic effects, i.e. no sign-action, no actual sign process will proceed. As Max Fisch
stresses “the fundamental distinction is not between things that are signs and things that are
not, but between triadic sign-action and dyadic or dynamical action” (Fisch 1986: 330, cf.
also Deledalle 2000: 44). Signs without actual interpreters can act only dynamically, i.e. they
can have only physical effects. This differentiation is crucial especially in biosemiotic
application —  I can consider any molecule or other stimulus as a sign, but does it really act as
a sign biologically, independently on the mediation of my interpretation? Does it have some
genuine object-level interpreter (or ‘system of interpretance’), or does it merely have the
effects of a chemical billiard ball?
3.4. The Result of the Second Derivation: Sign-Process as a Self-Controlled
Habituation
The most striking difference with the earlier concept is that within the second derivation,
two kinds of objects and three kinds of interpretants became recognized. The object can be
considered 1) as an immediate object, which is the object as it is presented in the sign for the
interpreter, or from the point of view of an utterer, the object in the intention of the utterer.
36 This principle has had the most suggestive application in biosemiotics: one of Jesper Hoffmeyer’s basic
(hypo)theses of biosemiotics concerning the habits of living systems and biosemiotic agents is that “whenever
a new habit emerges it tends to become sign for somebody” (cf. Emmeche and Kull and Stjernfelt 2002: 20-
21).
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The object can also be considered 2) as the ultimate efficient cause of the mental effect of a
sign that is as it is independently on any interpretation or intention. This real or dynamic
object can ultimately be taken as the totality of past causes of the representamen as an event
to be the sign it happens to be.37 In the cases of actually uttered signs, this does not contain
only the intention of the utterer, but also utterer’s unconscious motives and habits or other
various forces that have influenced the utterer. In principle, it contains everything that has
made him or her to utter that sign. The interpretation is supposed to reveal the relevant parts
of that. However, because the dynamic object is always absent in the presentation of a sign, it
has to be somehow acquainted beforehand or by other means. Its identification is dependent
on some collateral observation.38 (EP 2:408-9,429, 1907, see later Chapter 4.1.)
The interpretant, in turn, can be considered in three different senses: the recognition of a
representamen as a sign of its object creates the emotional or immediate interpretant as its
immediate result. It is “familiarity with a sign and readiness in using it or interpreting it” (CP
8.185, undated) appearing as some kind of ‘feeling’, ‘irritation’, or ‘excitement’ in the mind
of the interpreter. The interpreter or its mind should be taken here very abstractly —  most
generally, it can be described as that (cognitive) system which embodies the interpreting
habit. The process of interpretation does not necessarily arise above such state of ‘feeling’ or
‘readiness’, in which case the feeling just fades away and the system returns to its earlier state
without any significant effects. The system ‘buffers’ these de facto insignificant signs.
If the process proceeds beyond the temporary state of emotional interpretant, it evokes
some real actions or efforts, i.e. either directed internal restructurations or external actions of
the system. These energetic or dynamic interpretants act in themselves as signs tending to
produce some general conceptions, logical interpretants about the object of the sign.39
Interpretants form two chains of signs —  the chain of dynamic interpretants representing the
material, physiological, or ‘existential’ level of sign-process and the possible collateral chain
of logical ones representing the conceptual, ‘mental’, or generalizing level. These chains are
potentially endless but they may as well achieve a kind of end, the final interpretant or final
logical interpretant.40 This final interpretant would be a totally internalized and embodied
belief (i.e. the habit of action) about the (real or dynamic) object of the perceived sign. As
such, the final interpretant is no more a sign in itself (at least in this chain of signs under
investigation). (EP 2:418, 1907.) It is the form that the resultant action takes, the form of its
habit that either strengthens, modifies, or entirely replaces the earlier habit according to
37 “In order that a thing may be a true sign, its proper significate mental effect [i.e. its intepretant, TV] must be
conveyed from another object which the sign is concerned in indicating and which is by this conveyance the
ultimate cause of the mental effect. In order to be the cause of an effect,— or efficient cause, as the old phrase
was,— it must either be an existent thing or an actual event.” (EP 2: 429, 1907.) “Dynamical object [… ] is the
Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation.” (CP 4.536, 1906.)
38 Although a sign itself cannot express its object, a sign can, however, indicate what kind of collateral observation
is needed for the preliminary identification of the object (EP 2:408, 1907).
39 Logical interpretants are not necessary actual outcomes of every presentation of a sign: “The occasion may be too
early or too late. [… ] the occasion will come too late if the interpreter be already familiar with the logical
interpretant, since then it will be recalled to his mind by a process which affords no hint of how it was
originally produced.” (EP 2:414, 1907.) It seems that an accidental or ‘blind’ adoption of a conception or habit
is not included in the class of genuine sign-processes by Peirce. Logical, self-controlled adoption is required.
40 The emphasis of the ‘would be’ modality of final logical interpretants suggests that Peirce assumed every genuine
sign-process having a final interpretant, if not as actually achievable, then at least as some kind of limit in a
distant future (EP 2:410, 1907). Moreover, Peirce considered the final interpretant as the proper logical
interpretant so that the preceding concepts in the chain of logical interpretants are only imperfectly logical
interpretants (EP 2:418, 1907).
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which the interpretation was originally executed. The process of sign-interpretation is a
description of a rational learning process, a process of self-controlled habit-formation.
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Figure 5. Sign-process as self-controlled habit-formation
3.5. The Logical Character of the Second Derivation
When comparing Peirce’s early and late conceptions of sign and their derivations, at least
their outlook seems very different. This persuades us naturally to doubt whether they are at all
compatible and whether Peirce had only one theory and concept of sign. Moreover, what is
the doctrine of semeiotic or semiotic that Peirce intended to clear and open up —  is it
something more extensive than merely a theory of logic? Did he define the concept of sign in
some more general semiotic manner than merely as a logical concept?
Throughout his career (cf. W 1:304,322-323, 1865; CP 1.558, 1867; and EP 2:403, 1907),
Peirce seems to have an intention to provide a more general theory or concept of sign than
merely the logical one. Still, as we have seen, the original derivation of sign was exclusively a
definition of a logical concept. And if we look carefully at what he de facto did in the second
derivation, we will end up to a similar conclusion:
Firstly, the reasoning in the second derivation seems to proceed in such a way that the
resulting concept became adapted to the results of the original derivation. Peirce ends up to
the same basic terminology (object, representamen, interpretant) in both of his derivations of
the concept. This should hint that the concepts, or at least, the objects of the concepts, are
essentially the same —  especially if we take seriously Peirce’s ‘ethics of terminology’. If
there were two different concepts of sign, the ethics of terminology should have led him,
instead of using the old terms, to invent new ones for those “philosophical conceptions which
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vary by hair’s breadth from those that suitable terms exist” (EP 2: 266, 1903). It seems
probable that the main source for the differences in descriptions is the different perspectives
through which the object of the concept of sign was observed and the concept derived. When
considered from atemporal transcendental perspective, the interpretant has the mediating
character. When considered from objective perspective, the representamen is seen to mediate
information about the object to the forthcoming interpretant-signs. What is observed is the
same but the perspective of the observation is different.
Secondly, although the starting point of the second derivation was presented as more
general than the one of the original one, the idea of communication behind it is rather
restricted. It is clearly governed by the ideal of transparent rational communication, the ideal
that is most typically associated with the scientific community of investigators.41 The purpose
of such interpretation is to find out the intention of an utterer and the intention of an utterer is
to express oneself clearly, i.e. to get the interpreter ‘truly’understand what the utterer has in
mind. The kind of communication that aims merely to manipulate interpreter’s feelings and
behavior without any appeal to interpreter’s rational understanding was not referred to. The
blind reception of such ‘sign’ would not be a genuine interpretation, but its effects on the
receiver would be just psychical reactions.42 Instead, the idea of an inquiry is involved in the
starting point idea of communication just like in the original derivation, and therefore, the
normative criterion of communication, or any sign process here considered, is again truth.
The interpreter seeks to understand rationally what utterer’s conditions of uttering are,
independently on utterer’s own consciousness about them. Probably because of this implicitly
but clearly involved idea of rational or scientific inquiry, the result of the abstraction process
in the second derivation matches as well as it does with the result of the original derivation.
Again, despite the presumably more general starting point intention, the conception of sign
seems to narrow as the derivation proceeds so that the final result fits entirely under the class
of logical signs, whose normative criterion in interpretation is the truth about their objects.
As a summary, we can conclude that the initial prototype for the concept of triadic sign in
both of its derivations appears after all to be cognition with the desired increase in
knowledge. The result of both of these derivations is a logical concept of sign —  a sign that is
a representation about something that rational or scientific inquiry is supposed to reveal. The
concept of sign was built as an explanation for the possibility of knowledge and its most
natural area of application in Peirce’s mind was science or scientific investigation in general,
and as an essential component of it, human experience. This conclusion restricts the
possibilities to apply Peirce’s semiotic concepts in biosemiotics severely , as we will see.
41 Its another typical associate is the ideal type of bourgeois democratic society or publicity, the application that
especially Jürgen Habermas has made well known from the late 60’s onward.
42 One of the most dominating features of Peirce’s late semiotics, is to emphasize distinction between sign-action
and dynamical action (cf. Fisch 1986: 330). If this general distinction is not made, a Hegelian error will
follow, the reality of ‘secondness’, compulsive forces, or reactions will be ignored, and one will fall on the
doctrine of absolute idealism that ‘to be is to be represented’ (Peirce 1902, Memoir 33), i.e. that everything is
representation. This conclusion follows easily if one gives a foundational or primary status to transcendental
perspective —  even Peirce himself was somewhat attracted to such conclusion in his early writings (cf. W
1:324, 1865).
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4. CONSEQUENCES TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF THE
OBJECT OF SIGN
4.1. Restrictions on the Biosemiotic Application of the Object of Sign
Although the idea of triadic sign was originally thought to cover wider area than just the
objects of logical science, especially its three components were derived — in the both
derivations—  as logical concepts. A question arises, whether this composition can be
extended to cover a wider semiotic sphere. I have criticized elsewhere (Vehkavaara 2002:
304-308 and 2003: 558-561) the loose uses of the concept of the object of sign in
biosemiotics, and concluded that the concept of object does not belong among the basic
biosemiotic concepts. Its realization requires an interpreter with fairly complex cognitive
structure that is unlikely to be found at least in the most primitive (bio)semiotic agents. The
concepts of representation, interpretation, and normativity, for instance, are definable more
generally, without the concept of object and these more basic semiotic concepts are needed in
the definition and derivation of the concept of object. (Cf. Vehkavaara 2003.) My hypothesis
will thus be that while the concepts of representamen and interpretant of the Peircean triadic
sign are extendable and generalizable beyond the logical sphere, the concept of object of sign
is not —  it is an exclusively logical concept in the Peircean sense.
If the concept of the object of sign is taken under closer scrutiny, its role in the triadic
composition of sign has to be considered. Perhaps the most fundamental character that Peirce
attached to the triadicity of sign is its irreducibility, that the triadic form of the sign is not
reducible to any (linear) series of pairs (CP 2.274, 1902) and that all three components are
essential for the identity and action of sign. This has been one stumbling stone in biosemiotic
applications of Peircean concept of sign. For instance, Alexei Sharov (1998: 407) has
suggested that a “lineage ‘sees’ the environment through selective reproduction of its
organisms” so that “differential reproduction is a sign vehicle, environment is the object and
the change in gene frequencies is the interpretant”.43 The first objection concerns the
vagueness of the interpreter: it is far form clear in which sense the lineage can ‘see’ anything,
or act as an interpreter at all. Secondly, we can question whether the differential reproduction
and change in gene frequency are different phenomena at all, and even if they were different,
whether the change in gene frequency is the direct dynamic consequence of differential
reproduction. What difference in this presumed interpretation would it make if the cause of
differential reproduction — the proposed object of the proposed sign—  were pure chance
instead of environmental change? The answer is “nothing”. The presumed interpretant is not
produced in the context of the recognition of the representative relation between the presumed
representamen and its object. There is, of course, always a causal relation between the
environment and the differential reproduction in a population, but it is a representative or
significant sign-relation only for us —  they are we, not the lineage, that can ‘see’ differential
reproduction as representing the environmental conditions of the lineage. The determination
43 This suggestion was intended to be an upgrade for Jesper Hoffmeyer’s (1996: 16-24) initial biosemiotic
application of the concept of triadic sign and Peircean terminology to ‘vertical biosemiosis’, i.e. to onto- and
phylogenesis (cf. also Emmeche and Hoffmeyer 1991 and Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991).
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of the object of sign should not be the choice of the meta-agent (i.e. ours) but the one of the
object-agent.
The irreducibility of sign’s triadic form requires that the object of sign is accessible to the
interpreter also by other means as the sign itself —  sign can never provide the sole cognitive
access to object:
The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, [… ]
The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance
with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a
Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further
information concerning it. (CP 2.230-231, 1910.)
I.e. the object of sign has to be somehow acquainted (perceived or imagined) beforehand,
before it can be represented by any sign. Peirce talks about the need for ‘collateral
observation’:
The person who interprets that sentence (or any other Sign whatsoever) must be
determined by the Object of it through collateral observation quite independently of the action
of the Sign. Otherwise he will not be determined to [the] thought of that object. [… ]
I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is
so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea
signified by the sign. But by collateral observation, I mean previous acquaintance with what
the sign denotes. (CP 8.178-9, EP 2:493-4, from a letter to William James, 1909).
For a thing or event to act as a sign, some kind of ‘presignificational’ acquaintance with
its object is required so that an interpretant can be produced within a comparison between the
representamen and that vague ‘preconception’ about its object. This demand for independent
accessibility to object is not merely the feature of Peirce’s late conception of sign and sign-
action, but it is involved in his early ‘transcendental’ treatment of the issue too. In 1873,
Peirce wrote:
A sign [… ] must be affected in some way by the object which it signified or at least
something about it must vary as a consequence of a real causation with some variation of its
object. [… ]
The third condition of the existence of a sign is that it shall address itself to the mind. It is
not enough that it should be in relation to its object [… ] but must be regarded by mind as
having that relation. (Peirce, W 3:82-83, “Of Logic as a Study of Signs”1873.)
Thus, it was required that the object of sign is in real relation with the sign, and more
importantly, that this relation is cognized by mind, i.e. by some interpreter. It is not enough
that the interpreter (1) comes into contact with the representamen, but the interpreter must
additionally be independently acquainted (2) with the object and (3) with the real relation that
provides the connection between the object and the representamen.
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4.2. Restrictions on the Applicability of the Basic Sign-Types
The foregoing considerations lead to restrictive consequences on the application of
Peirce’s most famous division of signs into icons, indices, and symbols. These restrictions do
not concern so much the symbolic signs, because the representative relation of a symbol is
defined to exist merely in the mind of the interpreter.44 But iconic and indexical signs come
more easily confused with mere iconic and indexical relations. A plain objective similarity
(i.e. a joint real quality, form, etc.) between two ‘things’ is not enough to make the one a
potential iconic sign of the other, but this similarity must also be perceptible by the intended
‘interpreting mind’. If this would-be interpreter and its assumed perceptual abilities are not
taken account, then the whole idea of iconicity will be idle. Any two things are similar in
some respect and are thus capable of functioning as the signs of each other. Peirce did not fail
to notice that “everything is both similar and dissimilar to everything else” (CP 1.567,
c.1899). The role of the interpreter and its perceptual capacities are essential, though not
always explicitly expressed, in the action of iconic signs. What functions as an iconic sign for
us does not necessarily do so for dogs, and vice versa.
Perhaps even more importantly (for biosemiotics), a similar consideration applies to
indexical signs. The indexical signs are those whose significant character is some real relation
between the representamen and its object, the paradigmatic examples being a smoke as a sign
of a fire, a weathercock, and such ostensive gestures as a pointing index finger. The
demanded ‘real relation’ is usually a causal one —  or at least some causal connection is
involved in it. A mere causal connection between two things is not a sufficient condition to
make the one a potential indexical sign of the other, but the causal relation has to be somehow
beforehand cognizable by the interpreting mind. A smoke cannot represent a fire indexically
if the interpreter (even if only a would-be interpreter) has no kind of general conception45
about the causal connection between smoke and fire. A weathercock cannot be interpreted as
indicating the direction of wind without some general notion (even if a false one) about the
causal power of wind over the turns of the weathercock. Likewise, a pointing index finger
cannot direct the attention of an interpreter to the pointed object without the interpreter’s
implicit habitual assumption that generally, the location of the pointed object — together with
the intention of the pointing person—  approximately determines the angle of the pointing
finger.
In biosemiotics, however, our knowledge about the causes of some organic form is easily
mixed with the required ‘knowledge’ of the intended biosemiotic object-agent. The
consequence is that this organic form is thought to form an indexical representation of these
causes without any consideration about the identity of the proper biosemiotic agent or its
capability to have such knowledge. This seems to be the case in Sharov’s basically plausible
idea that a chromosomal DNA is a sign that represents the ancestor(s) of the zygote that
interprets that DNA-sign producing the descendant-organism as its interpretant (Sharov 1998:
44 The significant character of the representamen of a symbol is that the interpreter just happens to have such a habit
to interpret the representamen to represent its object. There is nothing in the representamen itself that makes it
represent its object symbolically. The being and existence of the representamen and the object are mutually
independent, or if there are some dependencies, they have nothing to do with the representative relation. There
is ‘a real causation’ between the representamen of a symbolic sign and its object, but it is completely mediated
by the habit of interpretation of the interpreter. (Cf. EP 2:274, 1903.)
45 Such ‘conception’ is usually assumed to be based on previous experience, either in individual sense (learning or
‘conditioning’) or in evolutionary sense (inherited ‘instinct’).
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407). The problem is that DNA may be the sole contact of the zygote with its (remote)
ancestors, and the zygote can not therefore have any kind of knowledge about the causal
relation between its ancestors and its DNA. Besides, DNA does not code only the structure of
its ancestors, but as well, it can be said to code some environmental conditions of its
ancestors. Moreover, there is a lot of effectual information in DNA that cannot be said to code
anything but are caused by genetic drift or other non-functional forces of evolution. The
zygote makes no difference about the causal origin of DNA —  all that matters is the existing
structure of DNA, not its genealogy. It has no independent access to it. I am not suggesting
that genes or DNA-strings would not act as signs for cells or organisms, but when they do,
they act as signs that have no objects at all (in Peircean sense). The concept of Peircean
triadic sign seems to assume too much about the ‘cognitive structure’ of interpreter in order to
be applied to DNA.46 The cells can be said to interpret the DNA-signs they contain, but they
have no control on how well the interpretants represent the (humanly determined) objects, be
these ‘objects’ their ancestors or their past environmental conditions. If there is some control
in this interpretation (as there most plausibly is), it does not relate to past causes but to its
actual functionality.
4.3. The Role of the Object of Sign
If I am right what comes to the applicability to the concept of object of sign, we have to
ask why Peirce regarded the object of sign necessary, as it seems. One possible answer might
be that after all, Peirce did not seriously endeavor to develop semiotic in the widest possible
sense, but restricted his semeiotic merely as the investigation of signs in general. The
logicians were invited as probably the best group to investigate that general semeiotic, which
would be limited in such a way that the object of sign is necessary. (EP 2:461, 1911, cf. also
Fisch 1986: 339-340 and Deledalle 2000: 61).
Semiotic in its widest sense should include e.g. psychological studies of signs. Peirce did
not ignore such studies completely, but it is not entirely clear whether he would include them
in semeiotic or only thought them resting on some results of it. At any rate, there should be no
necessary reason why a psychological concept of sign should take the similar triadic form as
the logical one. In biosemiotics, no such reason is necessary either. Psychology or psychical
sciences in general are dependent on logical principles similarly as all special sciences are.
Psychology cannot derive its concepts directly from logic since they are based on different
kinds of observation. In relation to psychical sciences, logic tackles with meta-level issues,
how their concepts are derived, how strong and what kind of evidence we have for such and
such theory, etc. If Peirce had ever thought that the structure of his logical concept of sign
necessarily provides the basic structure of the psychological concept of sign, it would have
been an anthropomorphic error —  a ‘ratiomorphic’ or ‘logomorphic’ error. Thus, another
possible answer to the question about why the object of sign appears necessary is that perhaps
46 The application is problematic also in many other paradigmatic biosemiotic exemplars as in the chemotactic
movement of E. coli bacteria (cf. Vehkavaara 2003: 574-577). What comes to the case of DNA, my first
attempt for revision (in Vehkavaara 1998) has appeared unsatisfactory. Paradoxically, if we omit the influence
of the confused terminology, the original intuition of Hoffmeyer and Emmeche (1991) seems to me more
defensible than its corrections that were supposed to be more just applications of the Peircean triadic sign (cf.
Vehkavaara 2002: 308).
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Peirce did fall on such anthropomorphic trap. Throughout his career, Peirce’s main interest
concerned scientific inquiry and its methodeutic, and though he did have other more
substantial goals too, he possibly could not always detach himself from that logical (or
methodeutic) context.
If the concept of object is not a necessary concept but a derived one and applicable only
to cases of a certain kind, what then is its role or function in Peircean theory? I feel forced to
suggest that the object of sign is necessary if merely truth-seeking signs are considered. A
sign cannot be true without being true about something. I suggest the hypothesis that the only
role that the object of sign has is to function as the internal measure of the success of
interpretation. And perhaps this is not so far from Peirce’s conception either:
Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, its object, ITS object, mind you.
[… ] There must be an action of the object upon the sign to render the latter true. Without that,
the object is not the representamen's object. [… ]
So, then, a sign, in order to fulfill its office, to actualize its potency, must be compelled
by its object. This is evidently the reason of the dichotomy of the true and the false. [… ] (CP
5.554, 1906)
The backside of the hypothesis is that if a sign-action does not seek truth, if the
interpretation has some other normative criterion of success (like practical applicability,
effectiveness, novelty, ‘beauty’, entertainment value, etc.), there is no need for the object —
the proposed objects of sign are irrelevant or ‘reducible’. If considered at the psychological
level, many apparent sign-processes are not even able to tend toward truth and because
biosemiotics is a kind of ‘psychical natural science’, similar observation should apply to
many (or most) biosemiotic sign-processes too.
5. THOUGHT IN ETHICS AND ESTHETICS
One of the main problems with the biosemiotic application of Peircean semeiotic is that
quite often it is not possible to make a difference between thought itself and intentional — i.e.
thought-guided— action. In anthroposemiotics, the difference between thought and action is
clearer —  thought is one kind of action.47 If I am right, the Peircean concept of sign is
designed for this specific kind of action. Remember that Peirce defined his logic, his general
semiotic, as the science of self-controlled thought, i.e. of thought guided thought, of truth-
seeking thought. Biosemiotics concerning only truth-seeking thought would be a too narrow
approach.48 Living systems do not generally search for ‘true conception’, they may not even
47 The difference between anthroposemiotics and biosemiotics is that animal thought can be approached only
through inference from the observation of their actions, but human thought is accessible, besides through
external behavioral observation, also through subjective and internal observation of our own thought.
Moreover, the anthroposemiotic generalizations drawn from our internal experience are controllable in
linguistic communication, but if we make biosemiotic extensions of such generalizations beyond human
sphere, the similar possibility for control via comparison is lost. We have no media to compare our internal
experience with the one of an ostrich, for instance. We have both internal and external knowledge about what
it is to be a human animal, but ultimately (or mostly) only external knowledge about other living systems
(including our own biological subsystems), what it is to be a paramecium, an ostrich, a bat, or a human liver.
48 However, truth-seeking thought is not completely absent in biosemiotics. It may well be applicable at least to
such animal learning that forms and updates some kinds of cognitive models (based on perceptions and
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be capable of that, instead, they are striving for practical ends, for appropriate ‘conception’.
Their interest is to bring up such behavioral habits that are successful in relation to these ends,
but it is mostly indifferent whether these habits are self-controlled. Peirce too admitted that
not all habits are formed in self-controlled sign-process (EP 2:431, 1907), which must mean
that they are not the objects of logical theory. Therefore, I have to withdraw my earlier
determination of the scope of biosemiotics as Peircean objective logic understood as a theory
of mind operative in nature (cf. Vehkavaara 2002: 302). Even its modification into ‘the
objective logic applied in the special phenomena of life’ would be misleading or too
restrictive a characterization. However, it would be too early to conclude that Peirce’s
philosophy could not provide the needed semiotic concepts for biosemiotics.
5.1. Phenomenology, Esthetics, and Ethics as New Sciences of Theoretical
Philosophy
Until the first years of 20th century, Peirce thought that theoretical philosophy included
only two subdisciplines, logic and metaphysics. The basic structure of the concept of sign as a
logical concept was fixed under the conception that logic provided the most abstract positive
science. However, in 1901-1903, Peirce’s conceptions about the philosophical sciences and
his own main work changed. He found out that theoretical philosophy — that he was
practicing himself—  actually contains a couple of other sciences that he previously had not
recognized it containing. According to this new conception, theoretical philosophy divides
into three subdisciplines, to phenomenology (later also phaneroscopy), normative sciences,
and metaphysics. Normative sciences divide further into three: to esthetics, ethics (renamed
later as practics), and logic (or formal semeiotic). This addition of new sciences did not
changed the hierarchical character of the classification of sciences —  higher sciences should
still be completely self-sufficient in relation to lower ones. Most importantly, logic with its
logical concept of sign appeared no more as the most abstract of the positive sciences.
Metaphysics was no more dependent merely on logic and mathematics, but it could now
appeal to these new sciences too.
Phenomenology was abstracted as the most general of all positive sciences. The
categories (firstness, secondness, thirdness) that were earlier derived as logical ones (as
categories of thought) and applied in metaphysics (as categories of being, cf. CP 1.300, 1894)
became now understood as primarily phenomenological ones. Logical, metaphysical, and
other corresponding categories are only applications of these phenomenological ones. Any
psychological, metaphysical, or logical refutation of anyone of these categories is only a
refutation of that application, not of the phenomenological category in itself.
Phenomenology (or phaneroscopy) is a pre-normative science that merely describes the
phaneron (or ‘universal phenomenon’). By phaneron, Peirce meant “the collective total of all
that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it
corresponds to any real thing or not” (CP 1.284, 1905). It is a description of the most general
elements (i.e. universal categories) that are included in any content of any mind. However,
‘mind’ here (as usually in Peirce’s philosophy) does not refer merely to “an instantaneous
instincts). The most secure application of Peircean semiotic concepts in biosemiotics appears to be, not
surprisingly, in the zoösemiotics of primates and other ‘higher’ mammals.
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state of consciousness” but also to the unconscious or implicit content of mind (EP 2:362,
1905). Consciousness is usually capable of concentrating only on one basic element of mind
at a time: either 1. to its actual content, i.e. qualities of feeling (firstness)49, 2. to the
existential event of change in that content, i.e. a sudden compulsive appearing of a new
quality that replaces the old one (secondness), or 3. to its mediative character, its bringing
something not present to mind, i.e. its reference to the future or past, which means some kind
of experience of generality or continuity in time (thirdness). Phenomenology is in itself a
study of phanera in their firstness, i.e. of what is common to all of them as they are. It is the
study of categories, their degenerate forms, and their mutual relations. Normative sciences
consider the general effects of phanera, their relation to ends (i.e. how they act upon us and
how our action impacts upon them), treating thus phanera in their secondness. Metaphysics
studies what is real in phanera, what they tell us about the reality in general —  i.e. it studies
phanera in their thirdness. (EP 2:197, 1903.) These new sciences appear in the similar sense
‘transcendental’ as logic did in our earlier consideration (cf. Ch. 2.3).
The idea of three normative sciences: esthetics, ethics, and logic, is a classical one, but
Peirce adopted it in a modified sense. He took all of them as theoretical sciences, not as Arts
or as disciplines that aim at practical purposes (as justice). Earlier Peirce did not consider
ethics and esthetics as the sciences of theoretical philosophy but — if sciences at all—  either
as practical ones (belonging to practical philosophy) or as psychical ones. But now they were
abstracted from their conventional practical nature so that especially ethics should not be
confused with the corresponding practical science.50 While logic was defined as a science of
self-controlled thought, ethics was determined as the general science of self-controlled
conduct. Because thinking is a species of conduct, logic appears as a kind of ethics of thought
—  ethics is thus a more abstract normative science than logic (e.g. EP 2:272, 1903). All the
principles that will be found in ethics are the principles of logic as well, but not vice versa.
The findings of logic do not bind ethical conceptions.
Speculative grammar
Logic Logical Critic
Speculative rhetoric
Metaphysics
Phenomenology/Phaneroscopy
Normative
  sciences
Metaphysics
Esthetics
Ethics/Practics
Logic/ Stoicheiology
Formal Critic
semeiotic Methodeutic
transformation
in 1901-1902
1898 1902
Figure 6. The transformation of Peirce’s conception concerning theoretical philosophy
49 However, the actuality is not the essential character of firstness or qualities of feeling. Instead, they are pure
possibles or “may-be’s” independently on their being actually appearing.
50 In order to avoid this misunderstanding and probably in order to obey also his “ethics of terminology” better,
Peirce renamed later his theoretical ethics as practics “which is put in place of ethics, the usual second
member of the trio” (EP 2:377, 1906).
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5.2. Thought in ‘Objective Ethics’
Now, we are approaching the crucial point that Peirce himself did not probably
recognize. The theoretical ethics — which does not include the traditional, practical ethics—
was about self-controlled conduct, i.e. about thought guided action. The concept of
controlling thought that is used here does not have to be the same as in logic, moreover, it
should be independent on the logical concept of thought as a triadic sign. There is no need to
give up the general argument that all thought is in signs, only the concept of sign does not
have to be a logical one. While the logical concept of thought-sign was derived as a self-
controlled thought, the controlling thought of action can be, but is not necessarily, in itself
controlled. If the concept of thought that Peircean ethics involves is not necessarily the one of
self-controlled thought, the correspondent concept of thought-sign must be a more general
than the logical one (which is a species of it). Instead of looking for (internal) self-knowledge,
this ‘ethical’ concept of sign concentrates completely on its (external) future effects, on the
results of action that it guides. It does not seek any true representation but successful action
—  and the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of this controlled action determines its validity.
The idea on which the ethical concept of sign is to be established should not be the one of
explanative representation as in logic, but of totally future-oriented anticipative or
constructive representation, which does not need an object to refer to.
Naturally, the guiding thought of action can be taken under investigation in order to
uncover its ‘object’ that has determined its becoming into existence. We can seek an
explanation for its power to control the conduct (for practical or theoretical purposes).
However, biosemiotic object-agents are only very rarely capable of seeking explanations of
any kind and even if they were capable of that, how much they would do that is another
matter —  consider how little even humans seek explanations for their success in their action.
When its role in the ‘ethical’ action is considered, this kind of ‘object in the past’ is totally
irrelevant, instead, only the force of the guiding thought over its interpretants in action is
relevant. ‘True knowledge’ may be a useful guide, but nevertheless not necessary to
guarantee the success of action —  also false models can function as successful guides of
action. From the point of the view of the object-agent, only the success of action matters
ultimately, not the reasons why it was or was not successful.
Another possibility to save the role of the object in anticipative representation — the
possibility that Peirce himself occasionally seems to propose (e.g. EP 2:493-494, 1909)—
would be to say that the object of this kind of anticipating thought is in future. But then we
would crash into another difficulty: the execution of action has to be an (energetic)
interpretant of the guiding thought, but in a case of successful action, the result of action is
also its object. If the object is supposed to be in future, there is no necessary difference
between the object and the final interpretant of a sign.51
Thus, my thesis is that generally the ‘ethical’ concept of representation or thought-sign —
the one of anticipative or constructive representation—  lacks the concept of object and is
therefore more suitable for the basic concept of biosemiotics than Peirce’s logical concept of
triadic sign. It is a more primitive and simple concept than the Peircean one, which is a
51 Moreover, this would mean the acceptance of the idea of backward causation, that future facts could influence
actual events by effective causation. It is quite unlikely that Peirce would accept such doctrine because that
would ruin his analysis of the dependencies between effective and final causation (cf. CP 1.211-213, 1902).
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special kind of it (cf. Vehkavaara 2003: 572-583). Because we need a metaphysical
application of it, an objective and real concept, it has to be considered from the objective
perspective and we get the ‘objective ethics’ of a kind. The use of the logical concept,
composed of triadic unity of its representamen, object, and interpretant, should be restricted to
model only explanative representation or truth-seeking representation since it is intrinsically
designed to do that. It does not model properly anticipative or constructive representation, the
primary function of which is to control action that is (positively or negatively) intentional,
purposive, goal-directed, etc.
Anticipative representation can generally be described as controlling the transition from
the current ‘disturbed’ or ‘unsatisfying’ initial state of the system into the ‘hopefully
satisfying’ future state. To put it simply, at the beginning, a system finds itself in an
unbalanced or disturbed state. As a result of that ‘internal experience’, it creates or calls for an
anticipative representation that is supposed to lead it out of that unsatisfactory state. This
representation redirects its actions so that the system reaches a new state. If that state is
satisfying, the representation was appropriate, if it is still disturbed, the procedure is either
continued or repeated with possibly some other guiding representation. The transition is self-
normative because the action can be unsuccessful and the ‘satisfaction’ is not a necessary
outcome of it.
’Disturbed’ or
’unsatisfying’
initial state of system S
Anticipative
representation
’Hopefully satisfying’
future state
of system S
transition
guidance,
’control’
Figure 7. A model of anticipative representation with a reference to an aspired future state of the system
This model of the anticipative or constructive representation does not have the form of
the Peircean triadic sign. The normative criterion for the success of the transition is
determined solely by the outcome —  the initial state has no role altogether when the success
is judged, but the success is merely the property of the result state. No comparison between
the representation and the initial state is made. Therefore, the initial state does not function as
the object of representation —  the anticipating or constructive representation does not
represent or refer to its initial state, and it is not in the same relation with the initial state as
the result state is. If it refers somewhere, it refers to the ‘aspired’ future state of the system (to
its ‘interpretant’) that it endeavors to construct.
In conclusion, I would determine the scope of biosemiotics as applied objective ethics
rather than logic, the objective ethics that would need a more general concept of
representation or sign than the one of Peirce’s semeiotic.
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5.3. Source of Normativity —  ‘Objective Esthetics’
However, mere ‘applied objective ethics’ is not enough. It provides only a theory about
how normative action is executed and acquired, not the nature of normativity itself, nor its
origin or emergence. In these matters, we have to turn our sight into Peirce’s first normative
science, esthetics although he apparently did not get any detailed description of its nature,
tasks, and content settled until, perhaps, his very last years. It was rather a battlefield of
several contradictory ideas. (Cf. Kent 1986: 149-163.) However, for our purpose, the limited
and unsettled content of Peirce’s esthetics does not matter much, since we are not interested
in his esthetics as such, but we are rather looking for something that is vaguely analogous to
it. Peirce’s esthetics, as much as one can make sense of it, seems to be a ‘transcendental’
science (compare CP 1.591-615, 1903), again. Biosemiotics, however, presumes the adoption
of the objective perspective needing thus an objective esthetics of a kind.
Esthetics was for Peirce, like ethics and logic, a theoretical, positive, philosophical, and
normative science and it was classified as the most abstract of normative sciences. Logic was
a subspecies of ethics and ethics has to appeal to esthetics for aid in determining its summum
bonum, the highest ideal peculiar to it (i.e. the ethical goodness). The argument goes on as
follows: “an ultimate end of action deliberately adopted [… ] must be a state of things that
reasonably recommends itself in itself aside of any ulterior consideration. It must be an
admirable ideal, having the only kind of goodness that such an ideal can have, namely,
esthetic goodness [… ] morally good appears as a particular species of esthetically good.” (EP
2:201, 1903.) Esthetics became thus characterized as a science
1. of self-controlled formation of ideals and
2. of that which is objectively admirable per se, without any ulterior reason,
independently of its effects (cf. CP 1.191, 1903 and EP 2:378, 1906).
Something analogous to this, an objective theory about natural (self-)normativity, seems
to be necessary for distinguished biosemiotics. The idea of natural normativity does not
necessarily contain any conception about some overwhelming cosmic tendency or global
teleology, but the idea is rather to establish a theory about local system specific internal
normativity. All natural systems of life do not need to be self-normative although some (or
many) of them seem to have some kind of self-normativity. That is enough for a theory,
which aims to specify and conceptualize the nature of such normativity. In its biosemiotic
application, following research-areas might fall under such ‘objective esthetics’:
1. Formation of subgoals for some higher goal.52 Most of the purposive or self-
functional action of animals is not valuable per se, but only in relation to some
‘higher’ goal. The homeothermism, the norm of keeping certain stable internal
temperature, for instance, has only instrumental value for homeothermic animals.
These animals might (in principle) give up their norm of homeothermism as far as
they could fulfill the higher goals, e.g. the goal of survival. ‘Choosing’ to be a
52 It might be more proper to classify a part of this, if not wholly, under objective ethics rather than under objective
esthetics. At least Peirce’s characterization of his theoretical ethics as “the study of what ends of action we are
deliberately prepared to adopt” (CP 5.130, 1903) supports this view. However, whether the question about the
formation of subgoals belongs under ethics or esthetics, is hardly important quarrel.
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homeothermic animal is just one possible way of life, to which poikilothermism is
an obvious alternative.
2. Determination of minimal system-relative normativity. Living systems have and
develop hierarchical goal, norm, need, value, interest, etc. structures, but each such a
hierarchy needs some kind of minimal or ultimate interest that is somehow
‘objectively valuable in itself’for the system. I suggest that each system have a
negative purpose to avoid extinction as its minimal natural self-interest. The
extinction is an absolute objective error of the system, because after extinction, all
the interpretations, signs, and actions end. Avoidance of extinction is an existential
precondition for every system. This minimal self-interest is embodied in the
functional structures of the system. It constrains all the choices the system can do
and is a mother of numerous possible subgoals, many of them mutually exclusive.
There are millions of ways to avoid extinction —  the whole diversity of life is a
living evidence for that. (Cf. Vehkavaara 2003, 568-572.)
Conclusion
Central part of biosemiotics should be developed as applied objective ethics that is aided
with applied objective esthetics rather than as objective logic. Objective logic with its concept
of truth-seeking sign is included in objective ethics, but it forms only a special and minor part
of it. Therefore, the biosemiotic applicability of the Peircean logical concept of triadic sign is
severely restricted.
6. POSTSCRIPT — ALL THIRDS ARE NOT SIGNS
6.1. Did Peirce Support Physiosemiotics?
If our interpretation of the content of Peirce’s semeiotic cautions us about being too
liberal in its biosemiotic application, we should be even more cautious, if not completely
restrained, in its physiosemiotic (or pansemiotic) application. It has been suggested that
Peircean semeiotic could be extended to apply to all natural processes, not only of biological
nature, but of physical as well, so that cosmic evolution and unidirectional thermodynamic
processes could be understood as semiosis. It cannot be denied that also Peirce seems to have
at least some fantasies about a “broader conception” that he was in despair of making
understood (EP 2:478, 1908). On the surface, the following quotation seems to suggest that
Peirce himself supported some pansemiotic extension:
[T]he entire universe —  not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe,
embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to
refer to as "the truth" —  that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, 1906)
The pansemiotic interpretation of this quote (e.g. by Deely 1990: 84) is nevertheless
disputable. A ‘transcendental interpretation’ can be suggested too —  and it seems more
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plausible if contrasted to the context of the whole text. Perhaps Peirce did not refer here to
natural sign-processes, but to ‘sign-objects’ that mediate between the reality and (human)
‘transcendental subjectivity’. Still, Peirce clearly aspired to generalize the concept far beyond
his original intuition of explanative representation. He gave a number of quite formal (but
vague) definitions of sign as following:
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a
Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. (CP
2.274, 1902)
However, Peirce’s thought does not seem to be quite settled in this issue. The dates of
these most formal definitions of sign seem to concentrate approximately on the years 1901-
1905 (cf. Marty 1997). At the beginning of that period, Peirce started to come aware about the
new philosophical sciences of phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics. Because logic could no
more be taken as the most abstract of positive sciences contrary to what he had used to think,
the mere logical concept of sign might have seemed to him inadequate and crying out for a
more general definition. However, from 1904 onward (cf. CP 8.332-341), when Peirce started
to approach his last and the most detailed conception of sign (the one described in Chapter
3.4), his definitions and other characterizations came less general and formal and more
contentual. Many of the quotations that I have presented e.g. in Chapter 4.1 as a support to the
limited interpretation of the concept of sign are quite late formulations. Moreover, Peirce
himself seems to have thought that such quite formal definitions as above are too vague or
involve ‘a vicious circle’:
[...] It is difficult to define a sign in general. It is something which is in such a relation to
an object that it determines, or might determine, another sign of the same object. This is true
but considered as a definition it would involve a vicious circle, since it does not say what is
meant by the interpretant being a "sign" of the same object. (Peirce MS 939, 1905, cited from
Marty 1997: §29.)
It may be that Peirce was seeking a secure physiosemiotic application of his semeiotic but
failed and therefore gave up this project around the years 1905-1909. The following quote
witnesses at least about his hesitation, if not more:
For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I have been constantly on
the alert to find a genuine triadic relation [… ] which is not either an intellectual relation or a
relation concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of life. I have not met with one
which could not reasonably be supposed to belong to one or other of these two classes. (CP
6.322, 1909)
It can be noticed that biosemiotics is safe if not physiosemiotics.
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6.2. Physiosemiotics and the Normativity of Sign
Independently on what was Peirce’s last word about this issue, physiosemiotic extensions
of Peircean semeiotic have been made, if not by Peirce, then by others, like John Deely
(1990), Peder Voetmann Christiansen (2002), and Edwina Taborsky (2001, 2003). However,
it can be doubted how far the generalization of the concept of sign can justifiably be drawn.
Mere reference to Peirce’s authority does not suffice, as we have seen. The central problem is
that if the concept of sign is generalized too far, it is in danger to lose — besides its distinctive
power—  exactly those of its characters that are required for logical, or more generally,
normative concepts. If physiosemiotics is based on such formal definitions as “a sign is
something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it,
into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself
stand to C” (Peirce 1902, memoir 12), it is hard to find any normative character out of it, at
least without further determinations. In its physiosemiotic application, the normative
character of sign is in danger to be vitiated into mere formative character. Taborsky, for
instance, talks about the physical universe as the evolutionary process of semiosis by means
of which inaccessible energy is transformed into information or accessible energy (Taborsky
2001: 1).
A famous example of a triadic sign is E=MC2, with E understood as the Object and M as
the Interpretant, as measured against the referential base, the Representamen, of C². [… ] the
sign includes the function of the Interpretant presenting itself as a truthful representation of its
Object [… ]
The triad, as an irreducible process, includes codal processes that act to promote
symmetry or cohesion. This is the referential focus, the representamen. And, it has two
processes that measure instances or asymmetrical actualities; there is the measurement of the
input energy, known as the object, which then becomes measured as the output, the
interpretant. (Taborsky 2003: 11.)
I find this kind of stretching of the concepts of object, representamen, and interpretant
confusing.53 Real normativity seems to be stripped off in such treatment. If the formula,
E = MC2, describes the form of a sign-process that produces mass (matter) out of unbounded
or free energy, as Taborsky claims, we must ask how that process could be unsuccessful, how
those ‘measurements’ (that are not made by humans) could fail. Their failure seems to mean
that they were not made at all in the first place. The ‘interpretant’ seems to be a necessary
outcome, if the ‘sign’ is to be existent at all. Within such physiosemiotic extension, some
‘sign’-processes (especially at the physical level) seem to lose their possibility to be
unsuccessful and at the same time still existing. Without the actually existing and erroneous
(or otherwise unsuccessful) signs, there is no real normativity. At least Peirce insisted that a
sign has to have a possibility to represent its object falsely:
[...] Suffice it to say that a sign endeavours to represent, in part at least, an Object, which
is therefore in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign even if the sign represents its
object falsely. (CP 6.347, 1909)
53 Although I would judge Taborsky’s terminology and interpretation of Peirce skewed, the propositions that her
sentences are intended to refer to are not necessarily erroneous —  nevertheless, their positive content is muddy
and difficult to relate.
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Correspondingly, Deely has suggested that a bone of a dinosaur is a sign of that dinosaur,
and the interpretant of that sign is the fossilized stone formation that used to be the bone
(Deely 1990: 90). This suggestion seems to fall on the same trap as Sharov’s biosemiotic
application (Sharov 1998, cf. Chapters 4.1 and 4.2). From our point of view, it is easy to
agree with Nöth (2001: 18) that it is hard to see how such ‘triad’ could be more than a
concatenation of two dyads —  its irreducibility does not seem to be a defensible claim.
6.3. All Thirds Are Not Signs
If the normativity of sign is given up in the generalization of the concept, it means that
the general concept of sign is transformed outside of logic. To where then? I can see only two
possibilities: either to mathematics, as in contemporary logic, or to metaphysics.
If a mere extracted mathematical form is taken as the abstracted concept of sign, its
normative character and within that, all of its positive characters are lost. It steps among the
numerous empty formalisms that cannot explain anything as such without the re-application
in logic, metaphysics, or special sciences. Naturally, a purely formal theory can be useful and
they are commonly applied in all species of special sciences. However, if semiotic and the
concept of sign is formalized so that they lose their positive content altogether and if they are
still called by their old names, the confusions easily follow. Once the concept is abstracted
and formalized into a mathematical concept, it starts to stand and develop on its own base.
There remains no guarantee that it is still applicable to the phenomena that it was originated
from. But the joint name of the concrete real concept and the abstracted formal one suggests
just that. The formalization of the concept of sign into a mathematical concept cannot be
prohibited — if done properly it may even be fruitful—  but to call it still a sign would be
utterly misleading.54 The confusion would be alike as in the common talk about information
where statistical, physical, algorithmic, and various semantic (and semiotic) concepts are
frustratingly mixed with each other.
The metaphysical transformation of the concept of sign cannot be rejected either, since it
is somehow inevitable if the biosemiotic realism is our target. Nevertheless, the metaphysical
application does not have to strip the concept of sign of its internal normativity. Quite
contrary, as we just argued, the theory of real natural normativity, i.e. of objective esthetics,
can (and should) be included in it. On the other hand, the stripping off the normativity may be
one legitimate way to develop a metaphysical theory. But if the concept of sign is still used in
such over-generalized sense (as Deely and Taborsky seems to do), our conclusion will be
alike as with its mathematical formalization.55 Such use would be misleading and as such, it
conflicts with the very purpose of pragmaticism —  to make our ideas and concepts clear.
Peirce tried to highlight and concretize this purpose by arguing for the ethics of terminology
that he himself found to be binding upon him:
54 Similar argument can be applied to criticize many other trials to naturalize, operationalize, or formalize originally
mentalistic concepts too. E.g. Barbieri’s (2003) concept of organic meaning — despite that it seems to stand on
its own feet—  seems to be similarly ‘over-generalized’ and thus easily misunderstood.
55 Though Peirce himself tended to make such over-generalization in one period, he seems to have ended up to
develop the detailed description of the exclusively logical concept of sign(-process) that would lose many of
its most wanted and essential characters if generalized too far.
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For philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which
suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical
terminology and those of the English language but yet with a distinctly technical appearance.
(EP 2:266, 1903.)
A ‘too’ generalized concept of sign would need a new name. And Peirce himself did
introduce such name, the name of the third category, thirdness, is reserved just for that. At the
beginning of his career, he thought that the category of thirdness would be covered by triadic
representations, but later he came to think that there are also other thirds than triadic
representations:
In 1867, [… ] I saw that there must be a conception [of thirdness] of which I could make
out some features, but being unfamiliar with it in its generality, I quite naturally mistook it for
that conception of representation which I obtained by generalizing for this very purpose the
idea of a sign. I did not generalize enough, a form of error into which greater minds than mine
might fall. I supposed the third class of characters was quite covered by the representative
characters. (CP 1.565, c. 1899)
Besides Peircean logical signs, also our more general idea about ‘ethical sign’, about
anticipative representation, whatever its more detailed conceptual structure will be, belongs
under the Peircean category of thirdness. Its leading character is mediative too —  it mediates
the transition from the current ‘disturbed’ or ‘unsatisfying’ initial state of the system into the
‘hopefully satisfying’ future state (cf. Chapter 5.2). But the category of thirdness, if taken as a
metaphysical category, consists of all the real regularities of nature, of all lawful or habitual
phenomena. The processes mediated by signs or representations, whether logical or ‘ethical’,
are probably not capable of fill it up.
Thus, my final suggestion is that at least the logical concept of triadic sign should not be
identified with the general concept of thirdness or its general metaphysical applications. We
need several conceptions of sign or representation, probably a nested hierarchy of them.
Peirce already established a part of that in his different typologies of signs, where the actions
of complex signs employ simpler signs they contain (cf. EP 2:17, 1895). The main deficiency
of his theory was that he considered only logical signs. If the detailed concept of ‘ethical’ sign
can be defined and the triadic logical sign could be defined in terms of such anticipative
representation,56 much of the work that Peirce have made may be embedded in such broader
conception.
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